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 Chapter 3 uses panel data of performance statistics, salary and birth place from 
1990 – 2008 to assess the return to team investment in undrafted Major League Baseball 
players. The study finds that over the first 3 years and over the first 6 years, undrafted 
players produce larger returns to investment than do drafted players over these time 
periods while international free agents produce smaller returns to investment than do 
drafted players.  The impact of a reverse order international player draft is discussed in 
light of these findings.    
 Chapter 4 develops a new measure of competitive balance that builds on the 
traditional binomial competitive balance ratio, R measure by incorporating end of season 
point outcomes in which games within the season meaningfully have ended in a draw.  
The measure is used to measure league parity in the professional sports leagues, the 
National Hockey League (NHL) the Russian Elite League (REL) and the Czech Republic 
League (CRL).  Granger causality is then used to test the effects of an increase in the size 
of the labor pool in the NHL, due to the movement of players to the NHL from the REL 
and CRL.  The corresponding effects on competitive balance of a decrease in the size of 
the labor pool in the REL and CRL are tested for as well. 
 Chapter 5 generalizes the simple Performance Enhancing Drug Game to include 
the scenario in which a player receives a payout through the disqualification of the other 
player.  The game is then generalized further to a four-person tournament to determine if 
 iv 
there is more or less incentive to use performance enhancing drugs.  Using examples 
from the 2009 US Open Tennis Tournament and the 1999 Winston Cup NASCAR Series, 
this study finds that relative to a single one-off game the tournament format creates less 
disincentive for athletes to use Performance Enhancing drugs and that a more equal 
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 When John Rawls formulated his general conception of justice by noting that “All 
social values - liberty and opportunity, income and wealth, and the basis of self respect – 
are to be distributed equally unless an unequal distribution of any, or all, of these values 
is to everyone’s advantage” (Rawls, 1971, p. 62) he was probably considering more 
weighty issues than North American Professional Sports Leagues.  But sports like life is 
often a game of chance in which “nature deals out attributes and social positions in a 
random or accidental way” (Rawls, 1971, p. 15).  It is the element of chance which draws 
fans to sporting events.  If the outcome of the game were certain then one would expect 
fewer fans in the bleachers and it is in the interest of professional teams that rely on this 
fan interest for revenue, to ensure that the outcome of the game maintains some element 
of chance.  A league which depends on the interest of its fans will endeavor to construct a 
set of rules, something like a social contract, which maximizes fan interest.  In this 
contract we might imagine a stipulation which inhibits teams with a large revenue base, 
due to geographic location, from paying incoming players a salary which exceeds the 
amount a smaller revenue team could pay.  A restriction placed on incoming players 
would be such a stipulation.  The reverse order draft in Major League Baseball (MLB) 
stipulates that the team which ends the season with the worst record is allowed the first 
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pick of incoming players the following season.  This sort of policy attempts to prevent 
high revenue teams from purchasing the contracts of the best incoming players thereby 
making them even more certain to win.  One might say that a reverse order draft is an 
attempt to maximize the talent of the team with the minimum amount of talent, a policy 
John Rawls might agree with.   An international reverse order player draft is consistent 
with a fair league policy in that it is directed toward reducing the impact of a team’s 
ability to win as the result of income inequality.   
 When a player enters MLB they are subject to the reserve clause. The reserve 
clause is the result of what has come to be known as the Federal Baseball decision of 
1922 (Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore v. National League of Professional Baseball, 
1922).  The upstart Federal League sued the National League for the right to sign 
National League baseball players arguing that the reserve clause was a violation of the 
Sherman Act of 1890.  The case went before the Supreme Court and Justice Oliver 
Wendell Holmes ruled against the Federal League noting that the reserve clause was not a 
violation of interstate trade.1
 [I]f, prior to March 1, … the player and the club have not agreed upon the 
 terms of such contract [for the next playing season], then on or before ten 
 days after said March 1, the club shall have the right to renew this contract 
 for the period  of one year on the same terms, except the amount payable 
 to the player shall be such as the club shall fix in said notice…. (Quirk & 
 Fort, 1997, p. 185)  
  The reserve clause from the 1920s to the 1950s read as: 
  
 The reserve clause allowed team owners to extend a player’s contract at the stated 
price every year.  The reserve clause was challenged by the St. Louis Cardinal Curt Flood 
when the Cardinals traded him to the Philadelphia Phillies at the end of the 1969 season.  
                                                 
1 For an in depth discussion of the history of the reserve clause in MLB and other North 
American sports leagues see Quirk and Fort (1997) or for MLB specifically see 
Bumgardner (2000).  
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Flood, along with the Major League Baseball Player’s Union, sued the commissioner’s 
office for free agency and $3 million2
 The restriction on the competitive bidding process has had, in addition to possibly 
improving parity between teams, the effect of reducing the salary of potential draftees
  Flood lost the case and what was left of his career.  
It was not until Jim ‘Catfish’ Hunter, with the help of arbitrator Peter Seitz, argued that 
the Oakland A’s owner, Charley O’Finley had violated a clause in Hunter’s contract in 
regard to his retirement fund.  In 1975, Hunter went from the A’s to the Yankees to 
become MLB’s first free agent and also the first player to sign a $1 million contract.  At 
the close of the 1976 season 25 major and minor league players became free agents 
marking 1976 as the first significant year of free agency in MLB (Sommers & Quinton, 
1982). 
3
                                                 
2 For a discussion of the case see (Leeds & von Allmen, 2008, p. 131). 
 by 
limiting the ability of high revenue teams to bid up the price of the player’s contract.  
History has shown that when teams have the ability to freely compete against one another 
player salaries do increase.  For example when the reserve clause was abolished in 1976 
and players with 6 years of MLB experience were allowed to become unrestricted free 
agents, player salaries in increased by 38% in 1976 and continued to grow at a rate of 
17.8% per year following 1976 when prior to 1976 the per year growth rate was only 
1.6% (Fort, 2006).  The dramatic increase in player salaries when teams are allowed to 
competitively bid for the rights to employ the player leads one to question the efficiency 
of the labor market for professional baseball players.  If players are paid their marginal 
  
3 Rick Monday, who was the first overall selection in MLB’s 1965 inaugural draft, 
received a signing bonus of $104,000 while Rick Reichardt received $250,000 in the year 
prior.  In recent years these numbers have been climbing.  Burger and Walters (2009) 
report that the total bonuses for the 30 first round picks in 2007 was US $62.9 million. 
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revenue product when their contracts are restricted then when they become free agents 
and their salaries increase they must be being overpaid while if they are not overpaid as 
free agents then they must be exploited as restricted players.   
 With the recent influx of players from countries not subject to the draft (see 
Figure 1.1), the issue of extending the draft one step further to include international 
players presently not subject to the draft is receiving some notice.  MLB’s The Report of 
the Independent Members of the Commissioner’s Blue Ribbon Panel on Baseball 
Economics (2000) lists an international draft as one of its five recommendations for Rule 
4 draft reforms noting that, “the implementation of a worldwide draft would ensure all 
clubs, regardless of revenue, relatively equal access to the crucial foreign player  
market” (Levin, Mitchell, Volcker & Will, 2000, p. 141).  The Blue Ribbon Panel Report 
explicitly states a Rawlsian position, in that regulation over incoming foreign born 
players is meant to reduce any disadvantage a small market, low revenue team would 
have in the MLB labor market. 
 The worldwide draft would undoubtedly provide relatively equal access to the 
foreign player market but would this benefit small market clubs or reduce the 
disadvantages associated with being a small market club, namely that a small market club 
has to pay lower salaries to remain profitable?  Some have argued that the draft has the 
unintended consequence in that it creates a mechanism through which perennial losers, 
who might also be low revenue teams, act as training centers for higher revenue teams.  
The losing team drafts the player and pays for training and developing the player and 
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Figure 1.1:  The percentage of players born outside the US, Canada or Puerto Rico 













the player since they cannot match the bid of the large market team.  This would only be 
a negative result for the small market team if they were not receiving a return, as 
marginal revenue, to their investment in the player’s salary.  If the perennial loser, who 
also perennially drafts high, gets a return in the form of marginal revenue product from 
the drafted and reserved player above what they are paying the player then the draft could 
have the effect of reducing the small market disadvantage.  
 The international player not being subject to the draft enters the league as a free 
agent, with the only requirement that he be 16 years old.  These so called amateur free 
agents could provide teams, small or large, with a cost effective means of acquiring 
young talented players.  Alan Klein argues this point:    
 For what a top college draft choice would cost in the United States 
 (approximately $500,000 [late 1980s]), one could sign 100 Dominican 
 prospects and be reasonably assured that a half dozen would become 
 Major Leaguers. (Klein, 2006, p. 124) 
 
A reverse order draft would eliminate this ‘brute force’ method of acquiring international 
players and could reduce the amateur free agent advantage to the small market team.  On 
the other hand, the competitive bidding process for incoming free agents could drive the 
salaries of the players above that of their marginal revenue products, resulting in what is 
often called the “winner’s curse.”  A “winner’s curse” occurs in sealed bid auctions, like 
the free agent market, due to the expected value of what is being bid on being equal to the 
average of all the bids, but the winning bidder is the firm/team that bids the most, which 
will be above the average, thereby cursing the overpaying winner.  All profit maximizing 
teams can ill afford to overpay players, but it seems reasonable to assume that teams with 
smaller revenues could also have smaller profit margins and could then be harmed by an 
overpayment more than teams with larger revenues.   
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 An example might be useful here.  Forbes magazine reports that the New York 
Yankees’ total revenue for 2010 was $441 million while the Florida Marlins total revenue 
stood at $144 million.  Suppose the New York Yankees and Florida Marlins were bidding 
for a player’s contract and that the winning bid for the contract is $10 million.  Further 
suppose that there is a curse attached to this player, such that his marginal revenue 
product (MRP) will be less than his contract.  Let’s say that if the Yankees won the 
contract then the player would produce $8 million in marginal revenue while if the 
Marlins won the contract the players MRP would be $5 million, due to the lower revenue 
potential of the Marlins.  Both teams would be overpaying, but the Yankees would be 
overpaying $3 million less than the Marlins.  In addition, the impact of the overpayment 
is compounded by the Marlins’ lower total revenue.  As a percentage of total revenue the 
Yankees would only be overpaying 0.5% (0.5 = $2/$441 x 100) of their total revenue and 
the Marlins would be overpaying 3.5% (3.5 = $5/$144 x 100) of their total revenue.   If 
the amateur free agent market was cursing winners then a draft could work toward 
reducing the disadvantage a small market team has in a competitive labor market by 
reducing the impact of the “winner’s curse.”   
 An international reverse order player draft is consistent with a fair league policy 
in that it is directed toward reducing the impact of a team’s ability to win as the result of 
income inequality.  The research question addressed in Chapter 3 asks would a reverse 
order international draft provide teams with a larger return to investment than competing 
on the amateur free agent market.  More explicitly, do amateur free agents receive a 
larger or smaller percentage of their marginal revenue products than do drafted players?   
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 Unlike in MLB, the National Hockey League (NHL) applies the reverse order 
draft to International players entering the league, but what happens when the talent 
supply from which this draft selects from increases?  During the first round of the NHL 
draft, NHL teams select the 30 best incoming players. One could suppose these players 
are ranked in descending order of talent where the first player selected is the most 
talented the 2nd player selected is less talented than the 1st but more talented than the 3rd 
and so on until the 30th player.  If the talent pool increases from one year to the next then 
it could be the case that there are, say 32 players talented enough to go in the first round, 
but since only 30 can be selected what would have been the 29th and 30th players selected 
moves to the 31st and 32nd position.  The top 30 players would now be collectively more 
talented than the top 30 players from the year prior.   
 How many fewer Stanley Cups would the Montreal Canadiens have won4
                                                 
4 The Montreal Canadiens have won the most Stanley Cup championships with 23, the 
last being in 1993.  The Toronto Maple Leafs are a distant second with 11, the last being 
1967. 
 if there 
were enough players to construct an opposing team just as talented as those early 
Montreal teams?  Andrew Zimbalist (1992, 2003, 2006) refers to the situation where 
there are more players chasing the same number of roster spots as talent compression in 
that the larger number of high talent players are being compressed into the same number 
of roster spots (i.e., the proportion of roster spots to population decreases, becomes 
compressed).  Talent decompression is the situation where the league expands the 
number of teams and the size of the talent pool remains relatively constant such that there 
are more roster spots with the same size population (i.e., the proportion of roster spots to 




decompression is similar to what has come to be known as the “Gould Hypothesis” after 
a 1983 Vanity Fair article by the evolutionary biologist Stephen J. Gould which argues 
that as the talent in a sports league becomes more compressed, variation in the skill level 
of the players will decline and parity in the league would improve.  Gould’s idea is taken 
from patterns of evolution.  Leaving aside for a moment revenue and salary differentials 
we could assume that, if given a choice between a more talented player and a less 
talented player, a team would naturally select the player who is more talented.  Gould 
was looking at why nobody has hit for a .400 batting average since Ted Williams did it in 
1941.  Gould’s hypothesis was that as the league expanded the size of its talent pool, 
through integration and global labor markets, high talent hitters were facing high talent 
pitchers more often and thus less likely to get a hit 40% of the time.  J. C. Bradbury 
frames Gould’s point. 
 As the overall quality of players improves, extreme achievements should 
 decline.  Adding or subtracting players affects the distribution of talent in 
 the league by including or excluding marginal major league players. 
 (Bradbury, 2007, p. 96)  
 
When a league expands the size of the talent pool, talent in the league becomes more 
compressed and as talent becomes more compressed extreme achievements should 
decline.  Extreme achievements can be at the level of the player, no season long .400 
averages in baseball since 1941, no season long triple double averages5
                                                 
5 In the 1961-62 season Oscar Robertson averaged 30.8 points, 12.5 rebounds and 11.4 
assists per game. 
 in basketball 
since the 1961-62 season.  Extreme achievements can also be at the team level.  The most 
points in an NHL season was achieved in the 1976-77 season by the Montreal Canadiens 




Washington Capitals managed the fewest points ever in an NHL season with 21.  One 
could imagine that the outcome of game between the 1976-77 Canadiens and the 1974-75 
Capitals would be far from uncertain.  We could hypothesize that as talent becomes more 
compressed the uncertainty of outcome increases.   
 On the other hand, talent decompression works in the other direction, again J. C. 
Bradbury, “Theoretically, when MLB expands its size the league becomes worse in  
absolute terms, because those who were previously not deemed worthy to play in MLB 
become members of new MLB teams” (Bradbury, 2007, p. 97).   
 When a league expands the number of teams, talent becomes decompressed.  
Rodney Fort (2006) notes that in Major League Baseball, it takes on average 7.2 years for 
an expansion team to achieve a .500 winning percentage (Fort, 2006, p. 142).  Since 
baseball, like most other sports, is a zero sum game, the first 7 years after an expansion 
would be a period where there were more teams with above .500 winning percentages 
and more teams with below .500 winning percentages than in prior years.  This could 
lead to the hypothesis that as talent becomes decompressed the inequality of the 
distribution of winning percentages would increase.    
 Professional ice hockey provides an interesting natural experiment to test the 
“Gould hypothesis.”  The recent influx of skaters born outside Canada or the US (Figure 
1.2) provides a case of talent compression in the NHL from which can be assessed the 
impact of the talent supply on league parity.  The rival World Hockey Association 
(WHA), in existence from 1972 to 1977, and the increased number of teams from 6 teams 
prior to the 1966-67 season to 30 teams by the 2000-01 season provide a case of talent 
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 Looking at Figure 1.2 it can be seen that the majority of the new NHL talent pool 
comes from Russia after 1989 and the Czech Republic in the early 1980s.  If it is assumed 
that the most talented Russian and Czech players choose to go to the NHL then the 
leagues from which these players would have played, the Russian Elite League (REL)  
and the Czech Republic League (CRL), are experiencing the opposite situation to that of 
the NHL, namely a situation in which there are fewer players chasing the same number of 
roster spots.  If the “Gould hypothesis” holds, we should see an increase in league parity 
in the NHL as the talent pool expanded in the 1980s and we should see a decrease in  
league parity in the REL and CRL as skaters moved out of these leagues to the NHL.  
Chapter 4 explores talent compression and decompression in 3 professional hockey 
leagues, the National Hockey League (NHL), the Russian Elite League (REL) and the 
Czech Republic League (CRL).  The underlying hypothesis is that an increase in the size 
of the talent pool will, through profit maximizing teams wishing to find the most talented 
players, more equitably distribute wins in professional sports leagues.    
 If the talent of the players on a given team determines the number of wins, losses 
or draws that team achieves then a measure of competitive balance which measures the 
distribution of end of season point totals will be related to the distribution of talent in the 
league (Zimbalist, 2003, 2006; Schmidt, 2006; Schmidt & Berri, 2003, 2005).  The 
notion of the uncertainty of outcome is closely related to the notion that at the outset of 
any game either team has an equal chance to win, or that each team has a fair chance of 
winning any game.  A league wishing to maintain fairness in the distribution of wins 
would want a contract which does in fact promote an equal distribution of wins, which 
begs the question, what is an equal distribution of wins when there is some degree of 
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chance in the outcome of any game?  Chapter 4 develops a measure to address the degree 
to which wins are distributed in a sports league which includes the possible outcome of a 
tie game given the natural affect of chance.  Chapter 4 goes on to use this measure to test 
how an increase in the size of the talent pool impacts the distribution of wins. 
 Finally, the notion of fair play, which we could assume affects uncertainty of 
outcome, comes down to fair play between the players on the field, the ice or the court.  
A just social contract would strive toward eliminating any means a player could 
potentially employ which would provide them with what is seen as an unfair advantage 
on the field, the ice or the court. The rules of play on the field are intended to establish 
a level playing field on which player actions which are seen as unsportsmanlike or 
unfair are penalized.  A fair league would want to ensure that the games themselves be 
fair in that no team or player is disadvantaged at the outset.  A fair league could reduce 
disadvantages through establishing a system of rules which prohibit athlete actions 
which lead one athlete or team to be unfairly advantaged.  For example, Floyd Landis 
had his 2006 Tour de France titled stripped from him and was suspended from 
professional cycling for 2 years when it was found that he used synthetic testosterone 
during a stage providing him with an unfair advantage over the other riders.   
 The first ban on performance enhancing drugs (PEDs) came in 1928 when the 
International Amateur Athletic Federation banned “stimulating substances” (Savalescu, 
Foddy & Clayton, 2004).  Hartgens and Kuipers (2004) demonstrate that the anabolic 
steroid androgen could increase muscular strength by 5%-20%.  Certain drugs are now 
banned in almost all organized sports.  The World Antidoping Agency (WADA) 
characterizes this as prohibited substances and prohibited methods: 
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 (i)   Prohibited substances:  stimulants; narcotics; anabolic agents; diuretics;  
  peptide hormones; mimetics and analogues; agents with antioestrogenic  
  activity; masking agents. 
 (ii)   prohibited methods:  enhancement of oxygen transfer; pharmacological,  
  chemical and physical manipulation; gene doping.   
  (Preston & Syzmanski, 2003, p. 615) 
 
The reasons for the ban are summed up by Preston and Syzmanski (2003): 
 (i)    it damages the health of athletes; 
 (ii)    it gives doped athletes an unfair advantage; 
 (iii)  it undermines interest in the sport;  
 (iv)   it undermines the reputation of sport. 
  (Preston & Syzmanski, 2003, p. 616) 
 
 Statement (ii) directly imports the Rawlsian sense of fairness noted at the outset 
and statements (iii) and (iv) follow from (ii), so it appears that antiPED policy is to some 
degree modeled on a Rawlsian just social contract.  It is in the interest of a profit 
maximizing organizing body to keep fans interested in any particular sport and if it is 
assumed that fans consider PED use to be an unfair advantage and fans dislike an unfair 
advantage (i.e., if fans behave as if they are considering a Rawlsian social contract) then 
it would follow that an organizing body would try to implement policy that establishes 
disincentives for PED use in sport. But how does a league go about implementing a 
policy which effectively and fairly eliminates PED use? Should PEDs be just like any 
other rule violation in sports?   
 If a baseball player charges the mound to fight the opposing pitcher the player is 
ejected from the game.  If there was not a penalty for this then we might expect that the 
Yankees would go ahead and sign Mike Tyson to a multiyear deal so he could charge the 
mound every other game.  If a player is caught using performance enhancing drugs in 
MLB he is suspended for 50 games without pay resulting in a potentially very large fine 
for the athlete.  For example, Manny Ramirez was suspended for 50 games for using a 
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banned substance. The fine effectively cost Manny $6.9 million dollars in lost salary.  Is 
this a fair punishment?  Chapter 5 addresses this issue by looking at the incentives which 
would lead the rational athlete to deviate from the fair social contract by using 
performance enhancing drugs to obtain an unfair advantage.  Modeling an athlete’s 
decision to use banned performance enhancing drugs as a four-player, two-stage 
tournament style game this chapter attempts to determine what would be a fair policy to 
deter performance enhancing drug use in sporting competition. 
 In addition to constructing contracts to promote fair play and the fair distribution 
of talent, sport organizing bodies have to construct a prize format which induces effort 
from the competing athletes.  In sporting events such as running, golf, tennis, swimming 
or car racing, where relative effort is the determining factor in final placing, the 
organizing body has to provide a prize structure which elicits maximum effort from the 
athletes involved.  If all the runners in the 100-meter dash choose to walk then the winner 
could win with a time of 50 seconds or more.  A Rawlsian sense of fairness would 
suggest that an athlete receive a reward equal in value to the effort employed by the 
athlete to obtain the reward but if all athletes collude and decide to each give little effort 
then the reward provided is unfair to the fans who are disadvantaged in that they are not 
the ones on the track or the court.  The organizing body has to establish a reward scheme 
which maximizes effort of the athlete to be fair to the fans but if that reward scheme is 
too unbalanced, in that the winner receives too large a reward, the athlete might try to 
elude organizers and cheat.  Chapter 5 looks at fairness on the court as concerns 
performance enhancing drug use by athletes.  In this chapter a game theoretic 
interpretation of an athlete’s decision to violate league policy and use banned 
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performance enhancing drugs is employed to determine what would be a fair deterrent 
mechanism for sport organizing bodies wishing to deter athletes from violating league 
policy.   
 Chapter 2 reviews the literature on the “winner’s curse,” competitive balance, 
tournaments as optimal contracts and performance enhancing drugs in sports.  Chapter 3 
addresses the return to investment in professional baseball players in MLB.  Chapter 4 
develops a trinomial measure of competitive balance and tests the “Gould hypothesis” in 
the NHL, REL and CRL.  Chapter 5 constructs a multistage tournament game and 
discusses the effect on athlete incentives of differing reward schemes and penalties.  















2.1   Player MRP and the Bidding Process 
 The notion that the winner in a bidding process can be cursed by over estimating 
the value of the item being bid on began1
                                                 
1 Thaler (1988) explicitly gives credit to this as the origin.  
 with Capen, Clapp and Campbell (1971).  The 
engineers were looking at prices of drilling rights for land.  They found that when oil 
leases were federally auctioned, the bids tended to be higher than the returns.  
“Unexpectedly low rates of return, however, follow the industry into competitive lease 
sale environments year after year” (Capen, Clapp & Campbell, 1971, p. 651).  If it is 
assumed that the auction is a common value auction, such that each bidder values the 
drilling rights equally and if it is assumed that the bids are unbiased so that “the mean of 
the estimates is equal to the common value of the tract” (Thaler, 1988, p. 192), then the 
winning bidder will have bid higher than the common value of the tract, since in order to 
win the auction the winning bid had to be the largest.  In an early piece of experimental 
economics, Bazerman and Samuelson (1983) ask 419 MBA students in 12 
microeconomics classes to bid on the a jar full of $8.00 worth of coins or paper clips 
(each paper clip had an established value of 2 cents or 4 cents depending on size).  The 







highest bidder would receive the value of the jar in exchange for paying her bid.  The 
mean winning bid for 48 auctions was $10.01 or $2.00 more than the actual value of the 
jar.  The authors argue that “in an auction setting, two factors are shown to affect the 
incidence and magnitude of the “winner’s curse:” (1) the degree of uncertainty 
concerning the value of the item up for bid and (2) the number of competing bidders” 
(Bazerman & Samuelson, 1983, p. 618).  
 These two early papers spawned two lines of literature in regard to the “winner’s 
curse.”  One line looked to the field for examples of a “winner’s curse” while the other 
turned to the laboratory.  Research from the field tends to support the existence of a 
“winner’s curse” in a variety of auctions.  Roll (1986) looks at the market for corporate 
takeovers and the purported shareholder gains from corporate takeovers and forms what 
he calls the “hubris hypothesis” which is that hubris drives bidding firms to pay too much 
for the target.  In other words, hubris causes firms to not recognize the “winner’s curse” 
inherent in auctions and adjust their bids downward.  Varaiya (1988) finds empirical 
verification of Roll’s hypothesis.  In this study, 67% of the time winning bids exceeded 
the market’s estimate of the gains from taking over the firm.  Koh and Walter (1989) and 
Levis (1988) find that in the market for initial public offerings of common stock (IPO) 
investors do manage to lower the bids to compensate for a potential “winner’s curse.” 
 If the potential for a “winner’s curse” is known by the bidders to exist, then the 
rational bidder should reduce her bid to compensate for the potential curse by bidding 
less.  Thiel (1988) shows that at least in the case of the highway construction industry, 






case of drainage leases.2
 Kagel and Levin (1986) constructed an experiment with multiple auction periods 
with the same bidders, so that over multiple auction periods the bidders had some 
experience with the experimental procedure.  Subjects were given starting balances in 
which profits and losses were added over multiple rounds.  If a subject’s balance went 
negative then the subject was not allowed to continue bidding.  Balances were set such 
that subjects were allowed to commit at least one large bidding error and still have the 
ability to participate in the following auction.  After each auction, bidders were given 
information as to the winning bid, all other bids and the true value of the item being bid 
on.  Thus, over the course of the multiple auctions, bidders could learn about the actual 
earnings of the winning bidder as well as acquire experience as to the relationship of their 
bids to the true value of the item.  The results of the experiment are interesting in that in 
groups of three or four bidders, profits were generally positive while in larger groups of 
six or seven profits were negative.  A “winner’s curse” then seems to be to some degree 
dependant on the number of bidders.   
   They found that firms that were geographically closer to the 
tract of land being bid on (what they call “neighbor” firms) better assessed the value of 
the land and won the majority of the profitable drainage tracts, while firms that were 
geographically further away (“nonneighbor”) firms earned zero profits.  This study 
highlights the relationship between a “winner’s curse” and asymmetric information, 
presuming that the neighbor firms might have had some bit of private information 
relevant to their bid which better allowed them to better assess the value of the lease.   
                                                 
2 A drainage sale “consists of the simultaneous auction of tracts which are adjacent to 






 One might argue, as Dyer, Kagel and Levin (1989) do, the students participating 
in the study are not experienced enough in the finer points of the auction process and as 
such are simply committing errors due to naiveté.  The authors look at the construction 
contract industry and separate the subjects into two groups, “experienced” and “naïve.”  
The “experienced” had “real world” experience bidding for contracts in the industry 
while the “naïve” subjects were college undergraduate students with no “real world” 
experience.  The authors found evidence consistent with a “winner’s curse” phenomenon 
in both groups. 
 Other experimental studies (Lind & Plott, 1991; Kagel & Levin, 1991; Kagel & 
Richard, 2001; Kagel & Levin, 1999) focusing on experienced versus inexperienced 
bidders continually find a “winner’s curse” with both experienced and inexperienced 
bidders in that experienced bidders “persistently earn only about half the profits predicted 
under the symmetric, risk neutral Nash equilibrium” (Kagel & Richards, 2001, p. 416).   
 Professional sports provide an interesting natural experiment to test the existence 
of a “winner’s curse” in auction markets in that the study of sports markets can marry the 
reality of the field studies with, to some degree, the control of experimental studies.  
Unlike class room experiments using rather small sums of money and relatively 
inexperienced subjects, professional sports leagues and the decision to employ players 
involve large sums of money and is (although some may disagree) the arena of experts in 
evaluation.  In addition the availability of data and focused nature of production (i.e., 
player’s produce readily observable wins or losses) allow for the researcher to have 






 The analysis of a “winner’s curse” phenomenon requires two values: (1) the 
actual value of the item and (2) the estimated value of the item equal to the bid offered.  
For example, in the case of oil tract leases, these values are the return derived from the oil 
extracted from the tract of land and the price paid for the right (the lease) to drill on the 
tract of land which should include the bidders expected profits from the land.  If the 
returns are below the price paid then the purchaser of the lease will have overpaid for the 
land.  If the overpayment is the result of a competitive bidding process then the 
overpayment is consistent with a “winner’s curse.”  In the case of professional baseball 
players the two values are the marginal revenue product (MRP) of the player and the 
player’s salary.  If the player’s salary exceeds his marginal revenue product then the 
player has been overpaid. 
 Any discussion of player marginal revenue product begins with Scully (1974).  
The Scully method estimates a player’s MRP from (2.1.0), (2.1.1) and (2.1.2). 
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where TRj is the jth’s team’s total revenue, Xj is a vector of team specific factors affecting 
team revenue, WPCTj is the jth team’s winning percent, PERFj represents the jth teams 
performance, PERFij measures the ith rostered players performance for team j, and Zj is a 






 The MRP of any team performance statistic, (slugging average, rebounds, goals, 
etc.) is then given by (2.1.4). 
 
 

























Scully estimated that a one-point increase in a team’s winning percent raised total 
revenue by $10,330 (i.e., Į2 = $10,330) over the 1968 and 1969 seasons.  He then 
estimated that a one-point increase in team slugging average improved a team’s winning 
percent by .92 points (i.e., ȕ1 = .92).3
504,9$92.330,10$  u jMRP
  Plugging these numbers into equation (2.1.4) for 
hitter’s yields: per point of team slugging average. 
 The next step is to determine a player’s marginal product (MP).  Scully assumed 
that “individual performance carries with it no externalities, so that team performance is a 
linear summation of individual performance” (Scully, 1974, p. 921).4
                                                 
3 Scully’s estimates for equations (1) and (2) are: 
  Scully used the 
 
REVENUEt = -1,735,890 + 10,330PCTWINt + 494,585SMSA70 + 521 MARGA +  
                  (-1.69)            (6.64)                      (4.61)                  (4.28)              
580,913NL – 762,248STDt – 58,523BBPCTt 
 (1.84)               (-2.42)                  (-3.13)     
 
PCTWINt = 37.24 + .92TSAt + .90TSWt – 38.57NL + 43.78CONTt – 75.64OUTt     
                    (.39)       (4.37)         (5.92)        (-4.03)         (3.77)               (-6.17) 
 
4 It should be noted that this move (assuming separability of player output) has come 
under some scrutiny from Zimbalist (1992) and Krautmann (1999).  Both of these views 
argue against the separability of equation (3).  For example, a player’s slugging average 
will possibly be higher if he has a good hitter hitting behind him in that the pitcher is 
more apt to pitch strikes to him to try and strike him out as opposed to intentionally 
walking him because he thinks the next batter is an easier out.  Zimbalist (1992) argues 
that a team’s prior winning percentage should be incorporated into the analysis, since a 






percentage of team output of performance to determine a player’s level of contribution to 
the team.  For offensive players he used the percentage of team at bats and for pitchers he 
used percentage of innings pitched.  Resulting in (2.1.5). 
 
 













where MRPij is the marginal revenue product of the ith player on team j, ATBATSij is the 
number of plate appearances by player i on team j, ATBATSj is the total number of plate 
appearances by team j, and PERFij is the slugging average of player i on team j.  As an 
arbitrary example, Scully uses Hank Aaron in 1968 where Aaron accounted for 11% of 
team at bats and had a slugging average of 498, Scully estimated Aaron to be worth 
$520,800 (=0.11 x 498 x $9,504).   
 The Scully method has been used, in either its original form or a refined form, to 
test for market size affects, Sommers and Quinton (1982) and Burger and Walters (2003) 
find a positive affect of market size on marginal revenue.  Burger and Walters find that 
the marginal revenue from a win is six times higher in large markets.   
 Cassing and Douglas (1980) were the first to test for the existence of a “winner’s 
curse” in the market for free agent Major League Baseball players (MLB).  Using the 
                                                                                                                                                 
consequently the opposing team cannot construct a game plan around the player in 
question.  Using this approach, Zimbalist determined that contrary to Scully’s estimate of 
a 28% underpayment of MRP, free agents received a 23% overpayment.  Krautmann 
(1999) looks at the salaries garnered by free agents and then uses this value to determine 
what players who have yet to become free agents should be paid.  He concludes that 
players who have yet to achieve the 6 years required for free agency earn 25% of their 
MRP, ‘journeyman’ players (i.e., players who are eligible for free agency) receive a 







methodology of Scully (1974) and estimating marginal revenue products of a group of 44 
free agents in the years immediately following free agency (1976-1978), Cassing and 
Douglas (1988) found that 28 of the 44 free agents received $2.7 million more than their 
aggregate MRP.  This equals a 20% overpayment which the authors conclude could not 
occur by chance. Kahn (1993) concludes that teams, wishing to avoid bidding wars and 
subsequent “winner’s curse” premiums sign players to long term contracts noting that, 
“The long term contract postpones (perhaps forever) the need to participate in the auction 
market” (Kahn, 1993, p. 163).  Contrary to the views of Cassing and Douglas (1980) and 
Kahn (1993), Sommers and Quinton (1982), Raimondo (1983), and MacDonald and 
Reynolds (1994) all conclude that MLB free agent salaries are commensurate with their 
MRPs.   
 Burger and Walters (2007) look for a “winner’s curse” in the MLB free agent 
market updating the productivity of players by using a measure that measures the number 
of wins a player generates above a replacement caliber player (WARP).5
                                                 
5 The WARP measure was developed by Baseball Prospectus.  The authors use the third 
generation of WARP titled WARP3. 
  The WARP 
measure includes both offensive and defensive player statistics and measures the 
marginal wins produced by the player in a given year.  Building on the prior research of 
Burger and Walters (2003) and Solow and Krautmann (2007) which demonstrates a 
market size effect on player value (i.e., a win in a larger market is more valuable to the 
large market team than a win in a small market is to a small market team), the authors 
show that small market teams could be afflicted with a “winner’s curse” while large 






teams systematically failed to limit their bids to conform to free agents’ diminished value 
in such markets [small markets]” (Burger & Walters, 2008, p. 117).  
 Eschker, Perez and Siegler (2004) test for the existence and persistence of a 
“winner’s curse” for foreign born players in the National Basketball Association (NBA).  
Using player data from the 1996-97 season to the 2001-02 season and constructing an 
Ordinary Least Squares regression (OLS), truncated and a censored regression, the 
authors find that in the case of the truncated data set6
 Burger and Walters (2009) revisit the issue of the “winner’s curse” looking at the 
rates of return for drafted player signing bonuses.  The authors found systematic 
overpayment to high school players relative to collegians as well as overpayment of 
pitchers relative to position players.  They also note that small market teams 
systematically fail to utilize their monopsony power to bid down bonuses commensurate 
with the players’ lower expected MRP in a smaller market.  Krautmann, von Allmen and 
Berri (2009) look at the impact of the reserve clause on player pay in the NFL, NBA and 
MLB finding that players under reserve in all three leagues experience some amount of 
underpayment due to the monopsony power of North American Sports Leagues.  
 foreign born players were paid 
160% more in the 1996-97 season and 108% more in the 1997-98 season.  This salary 
premium disappeared for the seasons 1998-99 to 2001-02 seasons prompting the authors 
to claim “The observed salary premium is consistent with a winner’s curse….  However, 
once teams gained experience in evaluating the talent of these players and began to 
devoting more time and effort to scouting international talent, this winner’s curse 
disappeared” (Eschker, Perez & Sigler, 2004, p. 1020).   
                                                 
6 The fact that the NBA has a minimum and maximum salary for players based on the 






2.2  Global Labor Markets and Competitive Balance 
Competitive balance within a league is actually a catchall term that refers 
to a number of different aspects of competition on the playing field, but, in 
essence, there is more competitive balance within a league when there is 
more uncertainty of outcome in league games and pennant races. (Quirk & 
Fort, 1997, p. 244)   
 
 As noted earlier, fan demand and subsequently team profits are driven by the 
desire of the fans to see their favorite team win, but not be absolutely certain they will.  
Neale (1964) recognized this peculiarity of sports leagues early on when he noted that fan 
demand for sport increases the more equal in playing skill are the competitors (i.e., the 
more uncertain the outcome).  Neale referred to this peculiar phenomenon in the sports 
economy as the "Louis-Schmelling Paradox". 
But now consider the position of the heavy weight champion of the world.  
He wants to earn more money, to maximize his profits.  What does he 
need in order to do so?  Obviously, a contender, and the stronger the 
contender the larger the profits from fighting him.  And since doubt about 
the competition is what aroses interest, the demonstration effect will 
increase the incomes of lesser fighters…  Pure monopoly is a disaster:  Joe 
Louis would have had no one to fight and therefore no income. (Neale, 
1964, p. 2) 
  
 This "paradox" not only points to the need for equal/fair competition, but also 
the lengths to which sporting organizations might have to go to achieve equal/fair 
competition.  Certainly fan demand for the Louis - Schmeling fight had a lot to do 
with the fact that Max Schmeling was a German and Joe Louis was an African 
American and the fight was in 1936, but what the 12-round fight, in which Schmeling 
won, also showed was that if a fighter comparable7
                                                 
7 It took 12 rounds for Schmeling to knock out a rather disinterested Louis in the first 
fight while it took all of 1 round for a focused Louis to knock out Schmeling in the 
second fight. 
 to Joe Louis could not be found in 






expanded its search for talent overseas.  Possibly to stimulate waning attendance 
levels, the National Hockey League decided to look for its own Schmeling.   
 The influx of foreign born MLB players has recently seen some interest by sports 
researchers. Osborne (2006) looks at skill specialization and country to find that Canada 
and Mexico produce more pitchers while Venezuelan and Puerto Rican players specialize 
in offense.  Anderson and Andrew (2006) report on the general trends of more foreign 
born players in recent years.  Schmidt (2006) and Schmidt and Berri (2005) look at 
competitive balance issues, finding that there has been an improvement in competitive 
balance associated with an increase in the size of the labor pool.  Andrew Zimbalist 
(1992, 2003, 2006) refers to the situation where there are more players chasing the same 
number of roster spots as talent compression in that the larger number of high talent 
players are being compressed into the same number of roster spots (i.e., the proportion of 
roster spots to population decreases, compresses). Gould (1983, 1996) argues that as the 
talent in a sports league becomes more compressed, variation in the skill level of the 
players will decline and parity in the league would improve.   
 The “Gould hypothesis” has been tested on a few occasions since first being 
introduced.  Chatterjee and Yilmaz (1991) use an entropy measure of the distribution of 
wins in MLB to find support for the “Gould hypothesis” in MLB.   Schmidt and Berri 
(2003) use Granger causality tests concluding that competitive balance in MLB improved 
in the years following integration (1950 - 1984) and improved with the influx of foreign 
born players in MLB in the 1990s. Schmidt (2006) uses a nonlinear unit root test and 
finds that “the driving force in competitiveness has been the growing geographical 






use unit root tests and the Herfindahl Herschman Index (HHI) on homeruns and 
strikeouts and conclude that the influx of foreign born players has been responsible for 
reduced variability in player performance.  Not all tests of the “Gould hypothesis” have 
been positive though.  Horowitz (2000) also uses an entropy based measure of variation 
and finds no evidence of shrinking variation in player performance.  Hessenius (1999) 
standardizes batting averages over time and finds that the absence of a .400 hitter is not 
the result of talent compression and the subsequent improvement of the average hitter, as 
Gould suggested but rather that when an oscillating mean batting average is taken into 
account, .400 batting averages move in and out of a feasibly obtainable batting average.     
 Just as Scully (1974) is the starting point for marginal revenue product estimation, 
Rottenberg (1956) is the starting point for issues of competitive balance.  Andrew 
Zimbalist notes that Rottenberg’s article, “anticipated the Coase Theorem8
                                                 
8 This would be the ‘theorem’ attributed to Ronald Coase as the result of Coase (1960), 
which argues that if property rights are assigned to externalities such that they can be 
traded and there are no transaction costs, bargaining would lead to an efficient allocation 
of property rights regardless of the initial allocation of the rights.   
 in 
understanding talent distribution across teams and argued that the profit motive would 
limit the accumulation of player talent on any single team” (Zimbalist, 2002, p. 111).  
Rottenberg argues for what he calls the invariance principle which claims that the holder 
of the rights to a player’s contract is irrelevant to the distribution of talent in a league.  In 
other words, players will play for the team’s that offer the most remuneration, whether 
the player receives the bulk of that remuneration or the team owner receives the bulk is 
irrelevant to for whom the player plays.  In addition to driving average MLB player’s 







provided researchers with a natural experiment to test Rottenberg’s invariance principal, 
namely that free agency will not have an effect on the distribution of wins in sports 
league.  Daly and Moor (1981), Fizel (1994), Fort and Quirk (1995), Lee and Fort (2005) 
and Scully (1989) find no significant effect of free agency and competitive balance in 
MLB.  Depken (2002) finds that free agency has reduced the concentration of homeruns 
and Horowitz (1997) finds a general trend of improvement but most of the improvement 
comes after integration in 1947.      
 Rottenberg also developed the relationship between competitive balance and 
demand for sporting contests: 
If, it is argued, other things being equal, a team in an area with a large 
population has larger revenues than teams in less populous areas, then, in a 
free players’ labor market, the former will get the most capable players, 
there will be wide variation among teams in the quality of play, contests 
will become certain, and attendance will decline. (Rottenberg, 1956, p. 
247)   
 
This passage makes two hypotheses: (1) teams located in more populated areas will have 
larger revenues and will use those revenues capably to obtain better players, subsequently 
winning more often and (2) fans prefer an uncertain outcome of a sporting contest to a 
certain outcome, what has come to be known as the uncertainty of outcome hypothesis 
(UOH).  Hypothesis (1) underlies both the formal models of a professional sports leagues 
and empirical research into the relationship between revenues and winning.  Hypothesis 
(2) is empirical and is most often measured using the relationship between competitive 
balance over time and attendance.      
 Assuming large market teams can and do pay more for talent and subsequently 
win more often (i.e., assuming hypothesis (1)), El-Hodiri and Quirk (1971) construct the 






is inconsistent with equalization of playing strengths and that the reserve clause will not 
have an effect on competitive balance.  The theoretical models tend to focus on how 
league institutions such as revenue sharing, salary caps or free agency impact competitive 
balance and how different assumptions of the model affect these results.   
 El-Hodiri and Quirk (1974), Atkinson, Stanley and Tschirhart (1988), Marburger 
(1997) and Vrooman (1995) use a Nash equilibrium framework with a simplified two 
team league to demonstrate that in a league of profit maximizing owners, revenue sharing 
will not affect competitive balance.  Rascher (1997) compares utility maximizing owners 
(i.e., assuming owners are maximizing wins) with profit maximizing owners and finds 
that revenue sharing will have a negative impact on competition if owners are 
maximizing utility while if they are maximizing profits, revenue sharing will have no 
impact.  
 Possibly as the result of the Bosman decision9
talent supply of professional athletes has come into question, namely the conjecture
 of 1995, which opened 
international labor markets for professional European sports leagues, the nature of the  
10
 El-Hodiri and Quirk (1971), Fort and Quirk (1995), Vrooman (1995) and Quirk 
and Fort (1997) assume that the talent supply is fixed so that if one team acquires a player 
and receives a talent gain then that gain is equivalent to a loss of the other team.  This 
 as 
to whether the talent supply is fixed or flexible (Vrooman, 2007). 
                                                 
9 “In 1995, the European Court of Justice abolished not only the existing transfer system 
but also the so called 3+2 Rule, which limited the number of foreign players a club could 
field” (Kesenne, 2006, p. 418).  
 
10 A more formal discussion of the role conjectures play in theoretical models of sports 







results in the conclusion consistent that revenue sharing will have no effect on 
competitive balance.  Syzmanski and Kessene (2004) and Syzmanski (2004) allow for a 
flexible talent supply such that one team’s talent decision has no effect on the other 
team’s winning percent.  The result is that revenue sharing has a negative impact on 
competitive balance.      
 Eckard (2006) argues that a fixed talent supply is more appropriate for 
professional sports leagues in that professional athletes earn so much money playing their 
sport that the next best alternative job would have a substantially lower salary, thus there 
is no incentive to move out of the market.  These “quasi rents” should not have an impact 
on the quantity supplied.  Eckard acknowledges that the quantity of talent changes over 
time (through minor leagues or training) but he argues that this is a long run phenomenon 
and at any one given time the quantity of talent in the league is fixed.   
 Kessene (2007) compares a flexible and fixed talent supply in a league with both 
profit and win maximizing owners.  Kessene concludes that “for both the flexible and 
fixed talent supply, … competitive balance will be more unbalanced and that the market 
clearing salary level will be higher under win maximization than under profit 
maximization” (Kessene, 2007, p. 57).  The question of win maximizing or profit 
maximizing owners is often drawn when comparing North American professional sports 
leagues and European soccer leagues.  It is generally considered that owners of North 
American Professional sports teams have profitability as their objective while owners of 
European soccer teams quest for profits are often hindered by regulations (Zimbalist, 
2003).  Lago, Simmons and Syzmanski (2006) note that “in France, Spain and Germany, 






limited by regulation or voluntarily, whereas in Italy and England, the scope for adopting 
commercial objectives has been greater” (Lago, Simmons & Szymanski, 2006, p. 5).  
 In regard to Rottenberg’s second hypothesis, namely, fans prefer an uncertain 
outcome of a sporting contest to a certain outcome, sports economists have measured the 
uncertainty of outcome hypothesis using a variety of measures, the most common of 
which involves the standard deviation of winning percentages11
gamesideal
5.0 V
 first introduced by Noll 
(1988) and further developed by Scully (1989) and Fort and Quirk (1992, 1995).  
Maximum uncertainty occurs when each team is equally talented and as such the 
outcome of the game is a random variable.  Fort and Quirk (1992, 1995) apply this 
methodology by looking at the distribution of wins in a sports league as measured by the 
stDQGDUGGHYLDWLRQRIHQGRIVHDVRQZLQQLQJSHUFHQWDJHVıactual.  Due to the fact that 
GLIIHUHQWOHDJXHVSOD\DGLIIHUHQWDPRXQWRIJDPHVıactual needs to be adjusted if leagues 
and different time periods are to be compared.  Fort and Quirk (1992, 1995) adjust the 
actual standard deviation of winning percentages with an idealized standard deviation 
intended to capture competition in a league of perfectly equal competitors.  “That is, the 
idealized measure applies to a league in which, for each team, the probability of winning 
any game is one-half” (Fort and Quirk, 1997, p. 245).  The idealized standard deviation is 
defined as, .  The actual standard deviation of winning percentages, 
ıactual  LVWKHQGLYLGHGE\WKHLGHDOL]HGVWDQGDUGGHYLDWLRQıideal to result in the measure of 
                                                 
11 “The measure most commonly used by economists over the years has been something 












V .  As R moves toward unity from above the 
league is said to be more competitively balanced. 
 Scully (1989) uses the R in MLB to look into the effect of the end of the reserve 
clause and rejects the hypothesis that competitive balance is affected by free agency.  
Vrooman (1995) uses the R measure and concludes that free agency has not made balance 
worse in MLB and that the National Football League (NFL) is most balanced while the 
National Basketball Association (NBA) is the least balanced of the major North 
American leagues.  Quirk and Fort (1997) use the R to test for free agency affects in the 
NBA, NFL, NHL and in MLB and conclude that there has not been a significant change 
before or after free agency for any league.  Fort and Quirk (1995) use the R to conclude 
that free agency had no affect on competitive balance in MLB and there was no change 
with a salary cap in the NBA.  They find some support that the rookie draft in the NFL 
improved competitive balance, but this was based on limited data (1930 – 1941).  They 
find that there was improvement in balance as a result of the draft in MLB’s National 
League but no improvement in the American League.  Zimbalist (2003) uses the R to 
look at competitive balance in MLB over time, noting that it improved from 1965 to the 
1980s but worsened after 1995.  He lists five factors which he believes are responsible for 
the worsening of balance, “increased revenue inequality, more synergies from cross 
ownership, the inversion of the drafts leveling role, talent decompression with the 
addition of four teams, and the post 1996 revenue sharing system – combined in the 
1990’s to exacerbate baseball’s competitive imbalance” (Zimbalist, 2003, p. 51).  
 Fort (2006) looks at the four major North American professional sports leagues 






is the most unbalanced league.  Competitive imbalance in the American League and 
National League has fallen by 13% and 42%, respectively, but has become worse in the 
2000s (Fort, 2006).  Competitive balance in the NFL has improved and Fort credits this 
to the fact that payrolls and revenues are relatively equal in the NFL.  In the NHL Fort 
concludes that imbalance has worsened by 33% since its inception in 1918 but has 
improved since the 1970s noting that the 1970s produced the most unbalanced period in 
NHL history.  Fort also looks at the R for the Big 10 and Pac 10 college football 
conferences.  He finds no trend in competitive balance from 1970 to 2004, in that the 
decade averages are always above 1.5 and below 1.7.   
 Berri, Schmidt and Brook (2006) look at 15 different sports leagues including 
European soccer leagues and North American professional leagues in the big four sports.  
Over 644 league observations the average R was 1.86.  The authors find that all the 
soccer and American football leagues had a lower R than 1.86. 
 Similar to the theoretical models of professional sports leagues, the empirical 
issues in competitive balance, noting a seeming lack of evidence that league institutions 
have an impact on competitive balance, seem to be turning toward the effects of how the 
talent supply impacts league competition.  Schmidt and Berri (2003) use Granger 
causality tests concluding that competitive balance in MLB improved in the years 
following integration (1950 - 1984) and improved with the influx of foreign born players 
in MLB in the 1990’s (using a data from 1911 – 1997). Schmidt and Berri (2005) use unit 
root tests and the Herfindahl - Herschman Index (HHI) on homeruns and strikeouts and 
conclude that the influx of foreign born players has been responsible for reduced 






size of the labor pool and the trend toward improving balance in MLB.  Using a nonlinear 
unit root test he finds that “the driving force in competitiveness has been the growing 
geographical diversity of Major League Baseball” (Schmidt, 2006, p. 10).   
 While the Bosman decision of 1995 could provide a natural experiment for 
researchers addressing the issue of flexible talent supply and competitive balance 
empirically, the research in this area has been limited.12
 Cain and Haddock (2006) also note the difficulty with the traditional measure and 
address the difficulty by constructing an ideal standard deviation of final point totals that 
includes ties.  Citing the fact that from the 1888-89 season until the 2003-04 season, Cain 
and Haddock calculate that wins occurred 37.705% of the time, loses 37.705% of the 
time and ties occurred 24.59% of the time in the English Premier League
  This could be due to the 
difficulty of measuring competitive balance in leagues which allow for a game to end in a 
tie (e.g., all European soccer leagues and the NHL prior to 2004).  Some researchers have 
noted this difficulty, “[G]iven that the index [the R] has not been designed with drawn 
matches in mind, it is not the most appropriate index to measure competitive balance in 
football leagues were the number of wins per season varies” (Mitchie & Oughton, 2004, 
p. 7).  The difficulty comes not with measuring the standard deviation of end of season 
point totals but rather with determining what an ideally balanced distribution of final 
season point totals would look like in a league that counts tie games toward this point 
total.         
13
                                                 
12Other reviews of the literature on competitive balance, Zimbalist (2002), Fort (2006), 
Sanderson and Siegfried (2003), Sanderson (2002), Humphreys (2002), Fort and Maxcy 
(2003) and Kahane (2003) do not mention the Bosman decision and competitive balance.  
 and that the 
 






distribution of game outcomes is similar for the Championship Division over the same 
time period.  This distribution prompts them to calculate an ideal standard deviation of 
the distribution in which “teams entering a contest had, before the fact, a 25% probability 
of leaving with a draw” (Cain & Haddock, 2006, p. 332).  Brandes and Franck (2007) use 
the Cain Haddock measure and Granger causality to test for a relationship between 
competitive balance and attendance for the major European professional soccer leagues, 
of Germany, England, Italy and France for the years 1963-63 to 2005-06.  The authors 
find no link between competitive balance and attendance for these leagues.   
 
 
2.3  The Performance Enhancing Drug Game 
  
 Lazear and Rosen (1981) introduced rank order tournament theory to provide a 
framework from which one can model compensation efficiency in markets where output 
is not easily measured.  In such cases a rank order tournament will be a more efficient 
means of allocating compensation, “[I]f it is less costly to observe rank than an 
individual’s output, then tournaments dominate piece rates and standards” (Lazear & 
Rosen, 1981, p. 848).  Rosen (1986) extends the earlier work demonstrating that 
sequential tournaments a nonlinear reward scheme is most effective in producing  
maximum effort from the worker/athlete.  Rosen (1986) notes that “the top four ranks 
receive 50 percent or more of the total purse in tennis tournaments” (Rosen, 1986, p. 
701).  He goes on to show that “an elimination design requires an extra reward for the 
overall winner to maintain performance incentives throughout the game” (Rosen, 1986, p. 






 Figure 2.1 shows how a rank order reward scheme works.  The marginal revenue 
is the reward to the athlete for moving up one level in the tournament, the marginal cost 
of effort is increasing as shown through the increasing slope of marginal cost curve and 
that as an athlete produces effort for a high place the marginal cost increases at a higher 
rate (i.e., is nonlinear).  The firm or sporting organizing body then sets a prize structure 
similar to that in Figure 2.2 where the marginal prize declines more rapidly (i.e., prize 
structure is more nonlinear) or less rapidly (i.e., prize structure is less nonlinear).  
Sporting tournaments provide an ideal setting for testing the efficiency of rank order 
compensation schemes.  Ehrenberg and Bognanno (1990) were the first theorists to 
empirically analyze rank order tournament theory in sports tournaments, using the 1987 
European Men’s Professional Golf Association they find that players “who faced larger 
marginal returns achiev[ed] better scores” (Ehrenberg & Bognanno, 1990, p. 86 – S).   
Lallemand, Plasman and Rycks (2008) find that larger prize differentials increase effort 
levels of professional women tennis players and that player abilities, as measured with 
apriori rankings are significant predictors of match outcome.  Again using professional 
tennis matches, Sunde (2003) finds a significant effect of prizes on effort levels, where 
effort is measured as total number of games played.  McFall, Knoeber and Thurman 
(2009) model a tournament with a grand prize (i.e., the winner of the majority of 
individual contests wins an additional grand prize) and find that in general and in the case 
of the Professional Golfers’ Association Tour, the winner of early contests is more likely 
to continue winning throughout the middle stages of the tour.  Using the total number von 
Allmen (2001) argues that a highly nonlinear reward scheme can create risk taking 








Figure 2.1:  Optimal effort levels. 
 Notes:  MR is the marginal revenue obtained from an additional unit of effort, and 


















































relative to the more equal reward scheme of NASCAR is intended to reduce this risk 
taking incentive. 
If rewards are highly nonlinear, drivers have an increased incentive to exhibit 
reckless behavior.  At speeds of 200 miles per hour, such behavior can have 
drastic consequences, not only for the driver that is struck but also for the 
perpetrator and other cars as well. (von Allmen, 2001, p. 76) 
  
 The relation of risk taking behavior and reward scheme can be carried over to the 
use of performance enhancing drugs (PEDs) by athletes competing to win in a 
tournament.  Since in most professional sports PEDs are banned and if caught the athlete 
faces a costly penalty if caught the use of PEDs can be seen as risk seeking behavior.  
Furthermore, if the athlete’s are equally skilled and already giving maximum effort, as 
we would expect at the professional level then variation in placing could be more 
attributable to luck rather than effort levels.  For example, if two equally skilled athletes 
are competing in a one off game then they each have a 50% chance of winning, while if 
four equally skilled athletes are competing in an elimination tournament then their 
chances of winning drop to 25%.  Equally skilled athletes can increase their chances of 
winning by doing something which the other athletes are not doing.  This could be a 
different training regime or the more risky and unsportsmanlike behavior of cheating.  
Intuitively we can think of this as though all athletes are equally skilled and are giving as 
much effort as is humanly possible.  If cheating will increase one athlete’s chance of 
winning above that of pure chance then we would expect that athlete to cheat, but if the 
chance of that athlete being caught cheating and subsequently disqualified is larger than 
the improved chance of winning then we would expect the rational athlete to not cheat.  
In a multistage tournament relative to a single one off game the probability that a 






This leads one to suspect that a multistage elimination tournament like those found in 
tennis would provide a disincentive for cheating behavior.  On the other hand, if rewards 
are highly nonlinear then the reward for first place as compared to fourth place might be 
enough to justify a rational athlete’s incentive to cheat and thus a multistage tournament 
with highly nonlinear payouts would create an incentive to cheat.  
 The interaction of rewards, penalties and athletes’ decisions makes the use of 
game theory a relevant tool for analyzing an athlete’s decision procedure and what sort of 
mechanisms an organizing body that wishes to deter cheating might impose.  Haugan 
(2004) focuses on the decision procedure of the athletes.  Haugan (2004) models an 
athlete’s decision to use performance enhancing drugs (PEDs) as a simultaneous one shot 
game.  He finds that if both athletes are assumed to be of equal talent then the result of 
the game is a prisoner’s dilemma game, but if it is assumed that the athlete’s are not 
equally talented then a mixed strategy results.  Eber (2008) maintains Haugan’s initial 
assumption of equally talented athletes but adds fair play norms to the athletes utility 
functions such that a player receives some amount of disutility when they choose to use 
PEDs while the other chooses not to use the drugs, by adding fair play norms, the game is 
changed from a prisoner’s dilemma to a stag hunt game with two pure strategy equilibria, 
pitting payoffs against risk.  According to Bryan Skyrms (2001) the stag hunt was first 
told as a story in Rouseau’s A Discourse on Inequality:   
 If it was a matter of hunting a deer, everyone well realized that he must remain 
faithful to his post; but if a hare happened to pass within reach of one of 
them, we cannot doubt that he would have gone off in pursuit of it without 
scruple... (Skyrms, 2001, p. 1) 
 
This story is an early example social contract theory.  Two individuals go out on a hunt 






requires cooperation of the two while hunting the hare does not.  If both hunters can 
cooperate and hunt a stag then the payoff will be larger, but there is also more risk in that 
if one chooses to defect then the nondefector will get nothing.  On the other hand, if both 
hunters choose to each hunt hare (no cooperation required) then the payoff will be lower 
but there is less risk involved, since they can both get something regardless of what the 
other does.  Formally, it’s a game with two pure strategy equilibria, one that is risk 
dominant (hunting hare) and one that is payoff dominant (hunting stag).  In the PED 
game, the risk dominant strategy would be to dope with the equilibrium at doping and the 
payoff dominant strategy would be not dope with the equilibrium at not doping.  Eber 
notes that “the main problem for the athletes becomes to coordinate their intentions and, 
hence, find a reliable coordinating device” (Eber, 2008, p. 319).   
 Following Becker (1968), Maennig (2002) models the use of banned PEDs in 
sports as a microeconomic model of illicit behavior.  Maennig discusses a variety of 
policy measures in regard to deterring the use of PEDs such as externality effects and ad 
ministerial costs.  Maennig concludes that, “An economic solution could increase the 
expected costs of doping by agreeing on financial penalties of a sufficiently high level” 
(Maenning, 2002, p. 83).  The policy of increasing the costs to the athlete for being 
caught using PEDs will act as a deterrent, but if the testing procedures are not completely 
accurate it could also place an even larger unfair cost on a false positive.  Berry (2008) 
notes that given the present state of the drug testing procedures in the Tour de France, 
there is between an 8% and 34% chance of a false positive; as such a Tour de France bike 







2.4  Summary 
 In summary, the literature on the existence of a “winner’s curse” in the market for 
free agents is mixed.  Cassing and Douglas (1980), Kahn (1993), and Burger and Walters 
(2007) find evidence consistent with a “winner’s curse” while Sommers and Quinton 
(1982), Raimondo (1983), and MacDonald and Reynolds (1994) do not find evidence 
indicating a “winner’s curse”.  The most recent work of Burger and Walters (2007) 
utilizes the growing trend of foreign born players playing in North American professional 
sports leagues.  The issue surrounding open labor markets has made its way into the 
competitive balance literature as well.  Syzmanski and Kessene (2004), Syzmanski 
(2004) and Kessene (2007) incorporate a flexible talent supply into the theoretical models 
of professional sports leagues while Schmidt and Berri (2003, 2005) and Schmidt (2006 
address global talent markets empirically.  Finally, questions surrounding an athlete’s 
decision procedures are being explored in the work of Haugan (2004) and Eber (2008) 
while the reward schemes are first discussed in Lazear and Rosen (1981) and the efficacy 















MORE BANG FOR YOUR BUCK:  THE INTERNATIONAL  
DRAFT AND THE RETURN TO INVESTMENT ON  




3.1   Introduction 
 
 In 1958 the New York Yankees offered a high school senior named Carl 
Yastremski $40,000 to bring his .650 batting to the Yankees roster, the Atlanta Braves 
countered with $60,000 while the Phillies raised that to $102,000.  After a year in college 
Yastremski signed with the Red Sox for $108,000 and went on to hit 452 home runs and 
3,419 Major League hits.  Six years later in 1964, Gene Autry and his Los Angeles 
Angels offered an outfielder from the University of Wisconsin, Rick Reichardt, $250,000 
to play for them.  Major League Baseball’s (MLB) old guard did not like the way things 
were going and instituted MLB’s first reverse order draft for players entering the league 
in 1965.  The Rule 4 draft allows the team with the worst record from the season prior to 
have the first choice in selecting a player coming into the league. The draft is intended to 
allow teams to move up into contention by restricting teams that presumably already have 
strong rosters from having first chance to sign incoming high talent players.  By 1990 the 





Canada, Puerto Rico and other U.S. commonwealths, territories and possessions and 
mandates that “teams are not allowed to trade the rights to draft players” (Staudahar, 
Franklin & Lima, 2006, p. 29).   
 In this chapter I assess the issue of whether or not teams signing international 
players are receiving higher or lower returns to their investment.  In other words, are the 
winners in the amateur free agent market cursed with overpaying for young talent and if 
so, does the reverse order draft act to reduce the overpayment?  Section 1 develops a 
model of player MRP, Section 2 estimates the proportion of player MRP that the team 
receives in return for a one dollar investment in salary and Section 3 concludes. 
 
3.2   Estimating Player MRP 
 Market size differentials have been at the center of sports economics since Simon 
Rottenberg published The Baseball Players’ Labor Market in 1956.  The argument as to 
the effect of market size1
 Proceeding along the lines
 on the relative performance of teams on the field has essentially 
remained unchanged.  Teams in larger markets have a larger demand than do teams in 
smaller markets.  These demand differentials drive the marginal value of a win to a large 
market team above that of a small market team subsequently a players win producing 
ability will be more valuable for a larger market team.    
2
                                                 
1 Market size is usually defined as population of the metropolitan area within which the 
team is located. 
 of Scully 1974 I estimate a player’s marginal revenue 
product with a three step process using pooled time series and cross sectional data from 
the 1990 to 2008 MLB seasons.  Step 1 determines the value of team output with the 
 





dependent variable, the total revenue of team i in year t adjusted to 2008 dollars, 
summary statistics for (3.1.0) and (3.1.1) are reported in Table 3.1, results reported in 
Table 3.2.   
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where WPCTit is the winning percent of the ith team in year t, POP_WPCTit is an 
interaction term which interacts the estimated CMSA population of team i in year t with  
the winning percentage of team i in year t. The variable POP_WPCTit is intended to 
capture the market size effect on the value of a win.  Burger and Walters (2003, 2008)  
and Solow and Krautmann (2007) demonstrate that MRPs vary according to the market 
size of the team, in this case larger markets drive larger MRPs.  Burger and Walters 
(2008) incorporate a population winning interaction term to assess market size MRP 
differentials.  Incorporating market size when testing for a “winner’s curse” is relevant 
since the “winner’s curse” phenomenon comes about in common value auctions in which  
the item being bid on is “worth the same amount to all bidders” (Thaler, 1988, p. 192).  
For example, if the value of a win is larger for the New York Yankees than the Oakland 
A’s any player’s performance that produces a win will be worth more to the Yankees as 
such the players salary can be larger and still not exceed his MRP.  The variable YEAR is 
a vector of year dummies, 1990 is the control. 
 Step 2 of the Scully method determines the degree to which inputs (player skills) 
affect output (team performance).  Assuming the team production function is linear and 






Summary statistics for equations (3.1.0) and (3.1.1) 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev Minimum 
TR 548 127.85 54.17 35.18 
SLG 548 0.42 0.03 0.34 
SO_BB 548 1.90 0.34 1.16 
POP 548 6.13 6.68 1.43 
Notes:  Total revenue of the ith team from Rodney Fort and is adjusted to 2008 dollars 
























Table 3.2  
 OLS estimates for equation (3.1.1) 
Variable     
     
WPCT 173,000,000*    
 (9.15)    
POP_WPCT 4.000*    
 (10.81)    
Intercept -13,200,000    
 (-1.21)    
1991 5,892,464  2000 47,100,000* 
 (0.71)   (5.91) 
1992 8,736,804  2001 59,700,000* 
 (1.06)   (7.49) 
1993 9,502,998  2002 59,600,000* 
 (1.17)   (7.47) 
1994 -26,500,000*  2003 65,700,000* 
 (-3.27)   (8.24) 
1995 -14,300,000  2004 75,900,000* 
 (-1.77)   (9.52) 
1996 5,214,840  2005 87,800,000* 
 (0.64)   (11.01) 
1997 20,100,000*  2006 95,400,000* 
 (2.48)   (11.97) 
1998 23,400,000*  2007 103,000,000* 
 (2.94)   (12.98) 
1999 36,900,000*  2008 107,000,000* 
 (4.62)   (13.45) 
     
R2 0.71    
N 548    
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where SLGit is the slugging percentage of the ith team batting and SO_BBit is the ratio of 
strikeouts to base on balls.3  Scully (1974) employed two measures to assess player 
motivation.  With the belief that if a team was out of contention, then the player might 
not be trying as hard, the dummy variable OUTit = 1 if the ith team was 20 or more games 
out of first place, 0 otherwise is intended to capture this effect.  While the dummy 
variable CONTit = 1 if the ith team was within five games of first place or was in first 
place in year t, 0 otherwise is intended to capture the view that players might be more 
motivated if they had a chance of making it to the post season. The dummy variable, 
EXPit = 1 if the ith team entered the league during the time period of 1990-2008 is 
included due to fact that it takes expansion teams4
 
 7.2 years on average to achieve a 
0.500 winning percentage (Fort, 2006).  Results for OLS estimates of equation (3.1.1), 











                                                 
3 Scully (1974) employs these two performance variables and in addition Berri and 
Bradbury (2010) recommend using the strike out to base on balls ratio to measure pitcher 
performance.  To the extent that these measures are biased, the bias will be downward in 
that the variables might not be capturing some player inputs, such as fielding statistics. 
 
4 There were four expansion teams over this period, the Colorado Rockies and Florida 
Marlins entered in 1993 while the Arizona Diamondbacks and Tampa Bay Devil Rays 





The next step differentiates equations (3.1.0) and (3.1.1) to determine the marginal 
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where POPit is the CMSA estimated population for the metropolitan area of the team on 
which player i played in year t. 
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where AB%jit is the percentage of team i at bats in which player j batted in year t and 
IP%jit is the percentage of team i innings pitched by player j in year t.  Using equations 
(3.1.4) and (3.1.5) to measure a player’s MRP allows for the market size affect to be 
incorporated into player MRP such that the MRP of any given player will be larger for 
large market teams.  For example, in 2001 Jason Giambi became a free agent and was 
signed for 1 year to the Oakland A’s.  Then in 2002 Giambi signed with the New York 





marginal revenue for the A’s and $7.6 million if he had a .660 slugging average for the 
Yankees.   
 Studies into MLB player MRP have by and large focused on players in the later 
half of their careers, particularly the years in which the player is eligible for free agency.   
Since players in the first 6 years of their MLB career are bound to the team that initially 
drafted them, these players tend to receive salaries near the league minimum for at least 
the first 3 years of service prior to arbitration eligibility which occurs after the 3rd year.   
The player is still bound by the reserve clause for years 3 through 6 their salaries tend to 
be somewhat lower than free agent salaries.  If teams are exploiting player services in the 
first 6 years then we should see total marginal revenue products for players in the first 6 
years of service to exceed salaries over these first 6 years.  Table 3.3 shows player MRP 
calculated using equations (3.1.4) and (3.1.5) for players over their first 6 years of MLB 
service. The yearly MRP estimates are summed over the first 6 years of the player’s 
career.  Returns are calculated as the sum of the total marginal revenue produced by the 
player minus the salary invested in the player by the team over the first 6 years of the 
player’s career.  The proportion of returns to investment is given in the final column.  
 An economically efficient labor market would produce a zero total return, in such 
a market the player would be receiving a salary equal to his MRP.  Table 3.3 provides 
some evidence that at least over the first 6 years of a players MLB career the market is  
inefficient, though in a direction opposite to that of a “winner’s curse” in that returns are 
positive and the return to salary investment exceeds 0%.  In all cases returns are positive, 
most likely due to the institution mandating that a player is only eligible for unrestricted 








































Pittsburgh 156 $431 $1,000 $571 132% 
Montreal/Nationals 157 $497 $1,120 $625 126% 
San Diego 141 $457 $1,020 $565 123% 
Tampa Bay* 88 $255 $560 $305 119% 
Milwaukee 155 $500 $1,090 $589 118% 
Florida* 127 $419 $909 $490 117% 
LA-Dodgers 139 $621 $1,330 $711 114% 
NY-Mets 121 $516 $1,070 $556 108% 
Houston 135 $535 $1,070 $533 100% 
Minnesota 136 $599 $1,160 $558 93% 
San Francisco 129 $467 $890 $423 91% 
Philadelphia 163 $702 $1,310 $612 87% 
Kansas City 134 $506 $928 $423 84% 
Colorado* 130 $515 $928 $413 80% 
Seatle 138 $583 $1,030 $447 77% 
Oakland 165 $681 $1,200 $516 76% 
Texas 146 $656 $1,150 $496 76% 
Cleveland 173 $780 $1,370 $586 75% 
Detroit 152 $630 $1,100 $473 75% 
Toronto 163 $795 $1,390 $593 75% 
Cincinnati 159 $698 $1,200 $504 72% 
Chi Cubs 150 $728 $1,210 $478 66% 
Atlanta 136 $687 $1,130 $446 65% 
Baltimore 138 $647 $1,050 $403 62% 
Boston 161 $856 $1,390 $531 62% 
Chi White Sox 170 $922 $1,490 $567 61% 
Arizona* 65 $271 $433 $162 60% 
NY-Yankees 121 $794 $1,260 $465 59% 
St. Louis 
 
130 $598 $934 $336 56% 
Notes:  ($Millions).  Included players signed between 1990 and 2008.  * = expansion 
 team between 1990 and 2008.  The Montreal Expos folded in 2004 and became 
 the Washington Nationals, some players signed with the Expos then moved 
 directly to the Nationals and these players were included as having played for the 






appear to be generating the most return to investment while the St. Louis Cardinals are 
generating the least.  Table 3.3 also tells a story about how teams think it best to produce 
a winning team.  Some teams prefer to develop young players from the time they enter 
the league hoping to find a diamond in the rough while other teams prefer to work the 
free agent market and acquire proven players, a strategy often more expensive.  The 
column Developed Players sums the number of players with less than 7 years on a 
particular team over the time period form 1990 to 2008.  The Cleveland Indians and 
Chicago White Sox appear to prefer the development method by developing at least 170 
players over this period.  Excluding expansion teams, and not surprisingly, the big 
spending Yankees and Mets top the list of developing the fewest players with 121, 
preferring to look to the free agent market to build their teams.  The large positive returns 
are due to the monopsony power the league exercises through the 6-year reserve 
requirements.  The question to be addressed in the next section is whether amateur free 
agents, generally players coming from Latin American or Caribbean countries, are 
producing different returns to team investment than are players who enter MLB through 
the draft.   
 
3.3   The “Winner’s Curse” and the Return to Investment  
 To test the hypothesis of a “winner’s curse” in the market for foreign born 
baseball players and to more formally analyze the return to investment in drafted and 
undrafted players, equations (3.1.4) and (3.1.5) are again used to compute player MRP 
for each year of the player’s career.  If undrafted foreign born players, amateur free 





salaries on player MRP should fail to reject the hypothesis that the intercept is equal to 0 
















       
 
 
    
 Player salaries and player MRP are then summed, producing SALjit and MRPjit 
over four different time periods in a player’s career, the first 3 years of a player’s career 
(Model A), the 4th, 5th and 6th year of a player’s career (Model B), the first 6 years of a 
player’s career (Model C), and the years after the first 6 years of the player’s career 
(Model D).  Model C contains the same players as Model B but salary and MRP are 
summed over the entire 6-year period for Model C and only over the 4th, 5th and 6th 
season of a player’s career in Model B.  All the players in Model B will also be included 
in Model C, but it could be the case that a player exited the league after their third season 
in which case they would be included in Model A but not Model B or C.  These  
groupings are made due to labor market regulations particular to MLB.  Incoming player 
contracts are subject to being reserved for the first 6 years of the player’s career.  A  
player with at least 3 years of experience playing in MLB but less than 6 years is eligible 
to renegotiate his contract with his current team.  While a player with more than 6 years 
of MLB service is eligible to shop his services to any team as a free agent.  Table 3.4  
describes the variables.  Amateur free agents are typically players from Latin American 
and Caribbean countries, the primary countries being Venezuela and the Dominican 
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coming from the Nippon Professional League (NPB) of Japan, 20 players, while a few, 6 
players,5
MLB team needs to pay a transfer fee to the International team.  In the case of NPB, if a 
player is drafted by an NPB team then that player has to become an International free 
agent before they will be permitted to sign with any non NPB team.  To become an 
International free agent a player has to play for nine seasons in the NPB (Klein, 2006, p. 
138); more often than not these are Japanese players but this does not have to be the 
case.
 come from Liga Mexicana de Beisbol in Mexico.  These two are grouped 
together because in order for an MLB team to acquire one of these players contracts, the  
6
 The team change dummies are included to try and tell the story of a player’s MLB 
career.  It could be the case that poor performing teams who draft high will draft talented 
  Due to the 9 years that a player has to play in Japan we should expect that the 
players in this category would have provided MLB teams with ample opportunity to 
assess their skill level and potential in MLB.  This should contrast with the lesser known 
potential of Dominican or Venezuelan players who have had less chance to display their 
MLB potential. 
                                                 
5 The descriptive statistics have two extra observations these come from players whose 
contracts were purchased from a Canadian team, George Sherill, and an unaffiliated 
minor league team, Terry Leach. 
  
6 In the data set there were two players who were not Japanese nationals who were 
drafted by an NPB team, Alphonso Soriano and Timo Perez.  Both of these players are 
Dominican nationals and both played for the Hiroshima Toyo Carp.  The Dominican born 
Alphonso Soriano initially signed with the Hiroshima Toyo Carp and due to the rule that 
the player has to play with an NPB team for 9 years Alphonso was probably going to be 
stuck playing the Carp’s academy team for a few years, then having to put in his 9 years 
with the NPB Carp.  To circumvent this issue Alphonso put in for early retirement with 
the Carp intending to sign with an MLB team.  For NPB teams if a player retires before 
achieving free agency the team owns the rights to the player’s contract into perpetuity.  In 
the case of Soriano, MLB intervened and the New York Yankees were able to buy out 





players and then sell these player’s contracts early on to try and reap a financial benefit 
from the draft which would show up with a positive coefficient in the early years of a 
player’s contract for drafted players.  This could also be the case for amateur free agents 
who a team may discover but feel that they would receive a larger financial benefit from  
selling this contract to another team.  Descriptive statistics for equation (3.1.6) are 
reported in Table 3.5. 
 The descriptive statistics are revealing in that over the first 3 years of a player’s 
MLB career, he is receiving much less in salary than he is producing in MRP.  The  
difference in total salary and total MRP between drafted players and amateur free agents 
is not very large while the amount of total salary earned for international free agents is 
about $3.5 million more and the production in terms of MRP is less than $2 million more.  
For all players the salaries jump up notably in the 4th, 5th and 6th years of their contracts.  
This is most likely due to arbitration eligibility after their 3rd year.  Even though the 
number of observations is fairly low for International players during these years, the 
mean total salary exceeds the mean MRP.  Over the course of the first 6 years, mean total 
salary and mean total MRP are similar for amateur free agents and drafted players.  In the 
case of the international free agent, the average productivity is very close to the average  
total salary.  As one would expect, once players are allowed to enter a free labor market 
(after playing for 6 years) the mean salaries jump up dramatically for amateur free agents 
and drafted players far exceeding the mean MRP for these groups.  The lower  MRP in 
the more than 6 years of MLB service group relative to the players with 6 years total 
experience are most likely due to the structure of the more than 6 years group in that 
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this reason, a further independent variable, SEASONS = number of seasons played in 
MLB, is added to Model D.  The mean total salary for international players drops relative 
to the first 6 years and the mean total MRP drops quite dramatically, again probably due 
to having fewer years to accrue MRP as a free agent but also might have something to do 
with these players having played professional baseball, in the US and Japan for over 15 
years by this point.   
 The coefficients, ȝ1, ȝ2 and ȝ3 can be used to calculate the return to investment in 
player services.  The player produces 1 unit of MRP, of that 1 unit the player receives a 
portion equal to ȝ1, ȝ1ȝ2 or ȝ1ȝ3 depending on group, which is the portion of a 
players MRP he receives as salary.  The profit the team receives is the portion of the 
players MRP less his salary, 1 - ȝ1, 1 – (ȝ1ȝ2) or 1 – (ȝ1ȝ3).  The percentage return to 
investment (ROI) is then: 1001
1
1 u P










for the group coefficients.  An efficient market would be the 
situation in which ROI = 0, a player would receive the full value of his production and the 
team would receive the full value of their investment.  Inefficiencies occur 
when 0zROI .  A “winner’s curse” would be consistent with ROI < 0 while ROI > 0 is  
consistent with player exploitation.  If ȝ1 < 1 then the team will be receiving a larger 
return, in terms of MRP, to their investment in salary and the player will not be receiving 
the full value of his contribution.  The case of ȝ1 > 1 is the case of the “winner’s curse”, 
whereby the team is receiving a return to investment, in terms of MRP, that is less than 
the investment.  The OLS estimations of equation (3.1.6) are reported in Table 3.6, Table 





Table 3.8 and Table 3.9 include Wald tests, H0ȝ1ȝi = 1, on the coefficients ȝ1, ȝ2 and 
ȝ3 to determine if these coefficients are significantly different from 1.   
 Looking first at Model A (first 3 years of service) the MRP coefficient for all 
players, pitchers only and hitters or position players are significant at the 1% level and  
are significantly less than one at the 1% level.  In the case of all players, each dollar of 
MRP generated yields only $0.23 in salary thus the team profits $0.77 (0.77=1-.23) on 
each dollar invested which in turn means a return to investment, %327 ALLROI .  
Position players in this group produce a larger return than pitchers, 
%231%297  ! PITCHERSHITTERS ROIROI  but the best bang for your player dollar is with  
the amateur free agent.  Taken as a whole (pitchers and position players) these players 
produce a %446 FAALLROI or a profit of $0.82 (0.82=1-(.234-.05)), for every dollar a team 
spends on an amateur free agent.  In this group, the coefficient on amateur free agent 
MRP is insignificant for pitchers but is significant for position players, suggesting most 
of the effect on the return to amateur free agents comes from position players,  
%405 FAHITTERSROI .  In the case of international free agents, teams seem to be operating 
more efficiently bringing economic profits closer to zero with a return on investment of  
49%.  A positive return 49% is still a wise investment from a profit seeking team owner’s 
perspective.  It does not appear that international free agents are cursing the team with a 
salary that exceeds their MRP.  One could suspect here that the information gathered by 
MLB general managers watching these players play in Japan is allowing them to make 
reasonably accurate estimates of these players MRP, though we will see in later models 
that this is probably not the case.  The CHANGE team dummy variable is significantly 






Model A, players over their first 3 years 
Model A 









 (20.26) (13.52) (17.28) 
F-test, H0: ȝ1=1 4396.55** 978.03** 2621.61** 
FA_MRP -0.051* -0.035 -0.054* 
 (-2.54) (-0.86) (-2.35) 
F-test, H0: ȝ1+ ȝ2=1 1725.49** 349.01** 1174.69** 
IFP_MRP 0.436** 0.024 0.528** 
 (10.01) (0.25) (11.06) 
F-test, H0: ȝ1 ȝ3=1 58.45** 50.52** 21.24** 
CHANGE $482,807** $440,224** $520,251** 
 (5.24) (3.28) (4.22) 
FA_CHANGE $234,209 $199,586 $247,373 
 (-1.45) (-0.86) (-1.1) 
IFP_CHANGE -$570,816 $1,306,164 -$1,915,565 
 (-1.08) (1.87) (-1.81) 
Constant $43,546 $119,328 -$365,817** 
 (0.46) (0.88) (-2.71) 
Observations 1997 939 1058 
R-squared 0.24 0.19 0.32 
Notes:  Dependant variable is total salary.  t-statistics in parentheses,* significant at 5%; 











Model B, players in their 4th, 5th and 6th years 
Model B 









 (21.01) (14.58) (20.21) 
F-test, H0: ȝ1=1 204.55** 29.97** 70.74** 
FA_MRP -0.072 -0.017 -0.098* 
 (-1.59) (-0.18) (2.06) 
F-test, H0: ȝ1+ ȝ2=1 116.91** 9.49** 66.68** 
IFP_MRP 1.13** -0.323 1.661** 
 (6.82) (-0.38) (9.43) 
F-test, H0: ȝ1 ȝ3=1 19.29** 0.50** 59.87** 
CHANGE -$1,046,782** -$978,973 -$994,722** 
 (-3.36) (-1.95) (-2.77) 
FA_CHANGE $734,707 $336,250 $1,117,623* 
 (1.66) (0.49) (2.03) 
IFP_CHANGE -$5,390,986** $2,286,784 -$17,200,000** 
 (-3.49) (-0.66) (-6.49) 
Constant $2,350,950** $2,904,592** $350,730.67 
 (6.60) (5.43) (-0.77) 
Observations 1117 486 631 
R-squared 0.37 0.36 0.51 
Notes: Dependant variable is total salary.  t-statistics in parentheses,* significant at 5%; 









Model C, players over their first 6 years 
Model C 









 (26.25) (18.64) (26.82) 
F-test, H0: ȝ1=1 631.46** 85.02** 338.36 
FA_MRP -0.064* -0.005 -0.076* 
 (-2.00) (-0.07) (-2.42) 
F-test, H0: ȝ1+ ȝ2=1 303.20** 24.40** 218.41** 
IFP_MRP 0.767** -0.481 0.985** 
 (8.46) (-1.56) (11.64) 
F-test, H0: ȝ1 ȝ3=1 9.55** 7.02** 46.99** 
CHANGE -$307,782 $165,202 -$469,484 
 (-0.83) (-0.28) (-1.18) 
FA_CHANGE $1,183,396* $529,330 $1,633,099* 
 (2.15) (0.63) (2.51) 
IFP_CHANGE -$8,791,004** $5,479,706 -$19,300,000** 
 (-4.79) (1.55) (-7.35) 
Constant $843,001 $837,227 -$1,835,295** 
 (1.95) (1.26) (-3.58) 
Observations 1117 486 631 
R-squared 0.46 0.45 0.63 
Notes:  Dependant variable is total salary. t-statistics in parentheses,* significant at 5%; 











Model D, players with more than 6 years 
Model D 









 (31.83) (22.33) (29.85) 
F-test, H0: ȝ1=1 170.41** 47.12** 288.40** 
FA_MRP 0.114 0.66** -0.017 
 (1.48) (4.75) (-0.19) 
F-test, H0: ȝ1+ ȝ2=1 101.26** 62.04** 169.39** 
IFP_MRP -0.124 0.274 -0.153 
 (-0.2) (0.27) (-0.19) 
F-test, H0: ȝ1 ȝ3=1 0.84 0.49 2.10 
CHANGE -$3,780,104** -$6,622,634** -$3,092,958 
 (-2.71) (-3.27) (-1.89) 
FA_CHANGE $534,550 -$2,141,913 $1,910,347 
 (0.42) (-1.46) (1.09) 
IFP_CHANGE $2,648,304 -$391,290 $457,903 
 (0.48) (-0.07) (0.05) 
SEASONS $306,942 $1,527,536** -$2,492,383** 
 (1.36) (6.26) (-7.26) 
Constant $842,406 -$3,098,248 $18,746,760** 
 (-0.37) (-1.07) (6.05) 
Observations 914 381 533 
R-squared 0.78 0.82 0.82 
Notes:  Dependant variable is total salary.  t-statistics in parentheses,* significant at 5%; 






that this is probably not the case.  The CHANGE team dummy variable is significantly 
positive in the all player specification, the pitcher only specification and the hitter only 
specification but loses statistical significance when the player groups are individually 
considered.  In Model A there is no evidence of a “winner’s curse” in any group.  Rather 
the contrary seems to be the case: Teams are paying less than what they receive in return 
in terms of MRP with the amateur free agent producing the largest returns. 
 When players are first allowed to engage in arbitration after their third year but 
are not yet unrestricted free agents, Model B, the return to investment approaches more 
economically efficient values.  All players produce a 68% return, pitchers produce a 38% 
return and position players produce a 42% return.  It should be noted here that the return 
to all players is not the average of the return to pitchers and position players due to the  
larger number of hitters relative to pitchers in the data set.  The return to all players is 
either driven down by hitters, when the coefficient on MRP for hitters is less than the  
coefficient on MRP for pitchers or driven up when the opposite is true, which we will see 
in when looking at Model D.   
 Profit maximizing team owners would be wise to build a team with drafted 
players and amateur free agents from this group but appear to be making unwise 
decisions when it comes to international free agents.  For international free agents in their 
4th, 5th and 6th years, the Wald test shows thaWȝ1+ ȝ2 is significantly different from 1 at 
1% and %42 IFPALLROI  which is consistent with a “winner’s curse” for international 
free  
agents during this time of their career.  ROI gets larger negatively when we look at the 





signing of international free agents seems to disappear after their 3rd year in MLB.  Could 
age be catching up with the international free agents?  Remembering that most of these  
players have already played professional baseball in Japan for 9 years and then adding in 
the 3 years of at least 162 MLB games these players could simply be nearing the end of 
their careers when they enter MLB.  The “winner’s curse” for international players could 
be due to general managers and talent scouts not taking into account the mileage in 
professional baseball these players have accrued over their careers.  In Chapter 7 of 
Baseball Prospectus’ Baseball Between the Numbers, it is estimated that the age at which 
an offensive player hits his peak is between age 26 and 29. 
 A typical hitter can expect to experience rapid improvement through age 
 twenty-three  and continued steady improvement through age twenty-six.  
 He will then typically see his performance plateau between ages twenty-
 six and twenty-nine. (Silver, 2006, p. 263)   
 
If a Japanese player begins his career at age 17 then he will be evaluated by MLB talent 
scouts in his 8th and 9th year which puts him on the upward trend of his career 
performance, age 25 and 26.  Then he hits his peak in his first 3 seasons in MLB between 
26 and 29.  After those first three seasons he begins to decline and the contract he signed 
when he entered is now providing him with too large of a salary relative to his 
performance in years 4, 5 and 6 of his MLB career.  Noting from Table 3.5 that the mean 
international free agent total salary is much larger in years 4 through 6 it could be the 
case that after the 3rd year, when players can renegotiate their contracts based on 
performance, teams overpay based on an expectation of an upward trend for player 
performance like what one might expect for a domestic player.  
 Players who change teams in their 4th, 5th or 6th year lose a significant amount of 





salary if they changed teams in the first 3 years.  The salary with which a player enters 
the league and the revenue potential of the team he signs with could be driving this result.  
The ability of any entering player to perform at the major league level is to some degree 
unknown.  We could imagine a case where a small market, poor performing team drafts a 
player high and pays him a high salary thinking his marginal productivity will be large 
enough to support the high salary but after 3 years the team realizes his marginal 
productivity is not high enough in their market but is high enough to produce an MRP 
more in line with his salary in a larger market.  The team that owns his contract for the 
first 3 years could then sell his contract to the larger market team for the value of the 
contract, which in a market with a larger revenue potential his marginal productivity 
could be worth the higher salary.  The very large decrease in an international player’s 
salary when he changes teams could be a similar phenomenon only larger due to the 
much larger initial salary of the international player.  Table 3.4 shows that the mean total 
salary for an international player over his first 3 years is $5 million while the mean total 
salary for all players is $1.6 million. 
 Model C includes players over the first 6 years of their MLB careers.  The 
coefficients on MRP are significant for all three specifications.  FA_MRP is significant 
and negative when all players are included and when only position players are included.   
IFP_MRP is significant and positive when all players are included and when only 
position players are included.  The R-squares are highest in Model C, suggesting this 
could have the most explanatory power of the Models discussed so far.  Looking first at 
MRP we see ROI < 1 for all three specifications, %96 ALLROI , %49 PITCHERSROI , 





We see that over the first 6 years of a player’s MLB career, amateur free agents produce 
the highest rates of return as a group, %124 FAALLROI , and amateur free agent position  
players produce the highest returns for position players %93 FAHITTERSROI  over the first 6 
years their MLB service.  The international free agents, although still generating negative 
returns, generate lower negative returns when the entire 6-year period is considered, 
%22 IFPALLROI  in general and as far as position players go, %37 IFPHITTERSROI .  So far 
it seems to be the international free agent who is cursing teams by generating less MRP 
than they are producing.  
 One interesting development in Model C is again the CHANGE variable; there is 
no significant effect of this for players grouped together, but amateur free agents receive 
a significant and positive salary increase when they change teams while international free 
agents receive a significant salary decrease when they change teams.  As noted above a 
player receiving a high salary is more likely to under perform his salary than a player 
receiving a low salary, while a player with a low salary is more likely to out perform his  
salary.  The small market team can sell the low salaried amateur free agents contract for a 
higher value to a higher revenue team based on his performance while the smaller market  
team can sell a high salaried player to another team for a value equal to his performance 
but lower than his salary, thereby dumping a high salary for something in return.    
 Model D looks only at players who are eligible for free agency, players with at 
least 6 years of MLB experience.  The high R-squares in this model suggest a fairly 
accurate specification of the player performance variables of strike-outs/base-on-balls 
and slugging percentage.  This argues that players are paid in accordance with their 





Looking back on the low R-squares in Model A relative to Model D suggests that 
inconsistencies in expected marginal productivity rather than inaccurate model 
specification could be the reason behind the low R-squares.  One would think though, that 
after watching a player play in MLB for 6 seasons, general managers would have a fairly 
accurate view of a player’s ability to produce at the MLB level.  The significantly larger 
than 1 coefficient on MRP suggest otherwise.  
 For players eligible for free agency, we see results consistent with a “winner’s 
curse” in all three specifications and subsequently negative rates of return in all three 
specifications, %41 ALLROI , %31 PITCHERSROI , %57 HITTERSROI .  In Model D, 
the affect of being an international free agent has no significant impact on the relationship 
of player MRP and salary, but amateur free agent pitchers are overpaid $0.66 for every 
dollar of MRP they produce and also have a highly negative ROI, %52 FAPITCHERSROI .  
It seems that the high positive rates of return for amateur free agents in their first 6 years 
of service is negated when they have been playing in the league for more than 6 years.  A 
player who chooses to change when they become eligible for free agency has a 
statistically significant negative impact on a player’s salary.  One could suppose that a 
team who signed or drafted a player when they entered the league then kept that player on 
their team for 6 seasons would have fairly accurate knowledge of their expected 
productivity, thereby not contracting a player in free agency and sending the player into 
the market where he then receives a lower contract when he signs with another team.  
The variable SEASONS, which was added to this model and not the others is significant 
and positive for pitchers but significant and negative for position players.  This could be 





amount of predictability as a hitter ages.  As a pitcher ages he can get more ‘savvy’7
 
 
allowing him to continue playing whereas as a hitter ages he might lose some of his bat 
speed which would make him progressively less productive as he ages.   
3.4   Conclusion 
 So what do these results tell us about rates of return, the “winner’s curse” and 
building a profitable MLB team?  First in regard to the rate of return to investing in 
players, the maximum rate of return comes from amateur free agents in their first 3 years 
( %446 FAALLROI ).  If a team wanted to maximize the rate of return for investment in 
players it would fill out its 40-man roster with amateur free agents, having to go to Latin 
America and the Caribbean to do this.   Of course we might suppose there are some 
intangibles with this method.  A team of 40 kids aged 18 to 20 years old might pose some 
problems that OLS regressions were unable to uncover.8
%45 PITCHERSROI
  More realistically one should 
look to players with less than 7 years of MLB experience, Model C.  A team would 
maximize returns by building the team around this group by selecting pitchers through 
the draft ( ) and position players as amateur free agents, 
%93 FAHITTERSROI .  If teams chose this method then for each dollar of revenue produced 
from the pitching staff the team would receive $0.33 (0.33=$1-$0.67) paying the pitcher 
$0.67 for each dollar produced.  The position players coming in as amateur free agents 
                                                 
7 Jamie Moyer is still pitching in MLB at age 48 and Tom Glavine, who retired in 2008 
pitched for 22 years. 
 
8 In some sense there is a precedent for this.  In the 1991-92 season the University of 
Michigan played five freshman basketball players on their team, Chris Webber, Jalen 
Rose, Juwan Howard, Ray Jackson and Jimmy King.  The team made it to the final four, 





would receive $0.51 (0.51=$0.59 - $0.8) for each dollar they produced and the team 
would receive the remaining $0.49.  The growth of players from Latin America and the 
Caribbean could be due to teams wishing to maximize rates of return and places like the 
Dominican Republic and Venezuela are places where they can, through amateur free 
agency, fill in their position player roles, relying on the draft for pitchers.   
 The last thing a team wishing to maximize the rate of return would ever want to 
do is sign a player who has been playing in the league for more than 6 years and is thus 
eligible for unrestricted free agency.  Results from Model D are consistent with a 
“winner’s curse” for all specifications with the most cursed players, those with largest 
negative returns to investment being pitchers who entered MLB as amateur free 
agents, %52 FAPITCHERSROI  and drafted position players,  %57 HITTERSROI .  In 
addition to unrestricted free agents, the international free agent produces a “winner’s 
curse” over the first 6 years of MLB service.  
 The results of the above analysis are then that amateur free agents produce the 
largest “bang for a teams buck” but once these players have been playing in the league 
for 6 years and are competing with unrestricted free agents in the labor market these 
players, along with the other unrestricted free agents, curse the teams that sign them.  It 
does not seem to be too much of a stretch that team owners and general managers in 
MLB use their monoposony power to exploit the amateur free agent, but why would a 
team hire an unrestricted free agent?  It could be that players who have been in the league 
for more than 6 years bring something intangible to the clubhouse.  Maybe the experience 
of playing so long has value to players who have not been playing as long producing 





ahead and lose money on an unrestricted free agent signing to have clubhouse leadership 
could balance an unrestricted free agent signing with an amateur free agent signing.  The 
high rates of return for amateur free agents will work toward balancing out the negative 
rates of return from high salary unrestricted free agent signings.  As the number and 
salaries of unrestricted free agents rise, teams could be turning to the academies in the 
Dominican Republic and Venezuela for amateur free agents who can fill in as position 
players and use the draft to bring in new young pitchers who then can learn from the 
more seasoned pitchers.  Looking back at Figure 1.1, and noting that “48 percent of 
players under Minor League contracts -- or, 3,370 of 7,026 -- were born outside the U.S” 
(MLB.com), and that 14 of the 32 first round selections of the 2010 draft were pitchers 
MLB might already be employing this method of team building. 
 In the case of the international free agents we do not see the monopsony 
exploitation even though they are subject to the same reserve rules (i.e., 6 years of MLB 
service) as all the others.  International free agents are producing negative returns relative 
to other players with less than 6 years of MLB experience.  This could be a classic case 
of the “winner’s curse” whereby the winning bid exceeds the expected value of the 
player.  Teams could be basing this international player’s salary on his expected 
performance, but failing to adjust for the fact that for the first 3 years in MLB he will be 
in his peak, but the next 3 years he will begin to decline.  Teams could be basing their 
expectations of a player’s performance as though the international free agent is a 23- or 
24-year-old player who was slowly brought along by minor league teams when in fact he 
is a 26- or 27-year player who very likely, due to his high skill level, was a workhorse for 





be exacerbating this phenomenon by forcing teams to sign these players for 6 years when 
they would be better served by only signing them for 3 years then adjusting downward 
their MRP estimates.     
 What about an international draft?  The Blue Ribbon Panel report suggests as one 
of its guidelines for changes in MLB to enhance competitive balance within the league 
that MLB institute an International reverse order draft to enhance competitive balance.  
Though this paper does not speak to competitive balance issues of the draft, leaving that 
question for future research, it does argue that the Rule 4 draft allows players to access 
more of their MRP than those players who enter as amateur free agents.  Over the first 6 
years of a position player’s career, the amateur free agent loses $0.08 of every dollar of 
marginal revenue he produces relative to the drafted player.  This underpayment could be 
seen as a return to training amateur free agents, since the mean time training as measured 
by the number of years between a player entering MLB as a contracted player and that 
players debut game in MLB is 4.63 years for amateur free agents and 3.54 years for a 
drafted player.  An international reverse order draft could reduce this training time by 
establishing minimum age requirements for international players like it does for domestic 
players.   
 On the other hand, an international reverse order draft could negatively affect the 
academy system, which although imperfect, does manage to find young talented players.  
At present funding for an academy in the Dominican Republic or Venezuela is provided 
by individual MLB teams.  It is unlikely that a team would wish to continue this funding 
if there was a chance they could lose a player they paid to train to another team through 





revenue to the academy system, so that the academies were not individually funded by 
individual teams but rather equally funded by all teams.  Future research could take up 
this question looking at Puerto Rico as a case example of what happens when a draft is 
installed after years of no draft, as it was in 1991. 
   An international reverse order draft could benefit poor performing teams by 
allowing these teams to sign the best foreign players and keep them in their organization 
for the 6 years of their MLB service.  The positive returns to amateur free agents over 
drafted players from the above analysis suggests that teams are doing quite well in 
exploiting these players already, possibly through the brute force method noted above by 
Klein which would be eliminated with a reverse order draft.  Teams would be unable to 
sign large numbers of young foreign players from which they can sift and determine 
which players would be best for their teams.  It might be that returns over the first 6 years 
of a player’s contract for amateur free agents are higher because these are the players 
who, after the sifting process, have shown to be the most talented.  A draft only allows a 
team to sign one player each round and might eliminate the cost effectiveness of the brute 
force method.  We do see that even though MLB exercises its monopsony power over 
drafted players as well as the undrafted amateur free agents it exercises it to a larger 
extent over the undrafted amateur free agents.    
 One possible method of reducing the low returns and the “winner’s curse” to 
international free agents and purchased players could be to extend the already established 
Rule 5 draft which applies to professional players and is held yearly in December.  The 





on the 40-man roster.  It would seem to be a natural extension to NPB players since these 
players are professionals with 9 years of professional baseball experience.  
 It is possible that by including Japanese Professional League players in the rule 5 
draft the negative returns to these players could be reduced, in effect transferring those 
returns to the other international players and cover the extra positive returns generated by 
the players who are at present amateur free agents.  For example, looking at Model C, we 
see that %124 FAALLROI  and %22 IFPALLROI .  International free agents receive $1.28 
(=.511+.767) for every dollar of MRP they produce while amateur free agents receive 
$0.45 (=.511-.064) for every dollar of MRP they produce.  There is certainly room for a 
$0.06 transfer to the amateur free agent bringing their return and degree of exploitation 
more in line with the young drafted players and still rewarding the international free 
agent for their years of service in professional baseball. 
 In sum, this research demonstrates results which are consistent with a winners 
curse in the market for international free agents and unrestricted free agents.  The 
amateur free agent on the other hand provides the largest bang for a team’s buck by 
providing an $0.82 profit to the team for every dollar in salary invested.  In regard to 
building a profitable team, a team should be built around players with less than 6 years 
experience, doing this by getting pitchers through the draft and position players through 
amateur free agent market.  Teams wishing to make a profit should avoid the 
international player market and the unrestricted free agent market, but if for some reason 
they wish not to do this teams can balance their balance sheets by offsetting unrestricted 
free agent signings with signings of young Dominican and Venezuelan players.   An 





amateur free agents from the team to the player.  On the other hand, an international draft 
could harm teams that depend on the exploitation of amateur free agents to increase their 



















THE FALL OF THE WALL:  COMPETITIVE BALANCE 
IN THE NATIONAL HOCKEY LEAGUE THE  
RUSSIAN ELITE LEAGUE AND THE  
CZECH REPUBLIC LEAGUE 
 
 
4.1   Introduction 
 
 As mentioned in the literature review, the most common measure to determine 
league parity involves the standard deviation of winning percentages1
                                                 
1 “The measure most commonly used by economists over the years has been something 
called “the standard deviation of winning percentages” (Szymanski & Zimbalist, 2006, p. 
173).   
 first introduced by 
Noll (1988) and further developed by Scully (1989) and Fort and Quirk (1992, 1995).  
Maximum uncertainty occurs when each team is equally talented and as such the 
outcome of the game is a random variable.  Fort and Quirk (1992, 1995) apply this 
methodology by looking at the distribution of wins in a sports league as measured by the 
VWDQGDUGGHYLDWLRQRIHQGRIVHDVRQZLQQLQJSHUFHQWDJHVıactual.  Due to the fact that 
differenWOHDJXHVSOD\DGLIIHUHQWDPRXQWRIJDPHVıactual needs to be adjusted if leagues 
and different time periods are to be compared.  Fort and Quirk (1992, 1995) adjust the 
actual standard deviation of winning percentages with an idealized standard deviation 






idealized measure applies to a league in which, for each team, the probability of winning 
any game is one-half” (Quirk & Fort, 1997, p. 245).  The idealized standard deviation is 
defined as, 
gamesideal
5.0 V .  The actual standard deviation of winning percentages, 
ıactual, LVWKHQGLYLGHGE\WKHLGHDOL]HGVWDQGDUGGHYLDWLRQıideal, to result in the measure of 




V .  As R moves toward unity from above the 
league is said to be more competitively balanced. 
 This chapter intends to address the computation of the ideal standard deviation.  
The Fort and Quirk measure computes the ideal standard deviation assuming a binomial 
outcome of either a win or a loss and as such 
gamesideal
5.0 V  makes sense in sporting 
events which end in either a win or a loss, but what about sports which can end in a tie 
game such as hockey or soccer?  In sports such as these a trinomial measure is needed to 
measure the distribution of end of season point totals.  
 Section 1 develops and analyses a measure of competitive balance for the NHL 
which extends the standard competitive balance ratio, or the R measure, beyond the 
binomial case to sports leagues in which games can meaningfully end in a draw.  Section 
2 looks at the effect the size of the talent pool has on the equal distribution of end of 
season point totals.  Section 3 develops the measure for the REL and CRL and compares 
league parity in the NHL, REL and CRL.  Section 4 uses league demographic data and 
Granger causality to test the effect of a change in talent supply on competitive balance in 






4.2   Measuring Parity in the NHL 
 For most (1917-1998) of the NHL’s history each game had 3 potential outcomes, 
a win, a loss and a tie with a point outcome in which a win was worth 2 points, a loss was 
worth 0 points and a draw worth 1 point.  The original scoring system, call it system 1, 
was changed in 1999 to each game having 4 potential outcomes in which a win is worth 2 
points, a loss worth 0, an overtime loss worth 1 and a draw at the end of overtime worth 1 
for both teams, call this scoring system 2.  The present system, system 3 (2005 – present) 
returned to 3 potential outcomes but eliminated tie games by ending the overtime period, 
if tied, with a shootout.  Under system 3 a win is worth 2 points, a loss 0 and an overtime 
loss is worth 1 point.  Table 4.1 summarizes these periods for the NHL. 
 We can, see from Table 4.1 that the change in the scoring systems from System 1 
to System 2 reduced the number of tie games.  Counting an overtime loss as 1 point 
instead of in the old system which counted an overtime loss as 0 points could induce 
players to be satisfied with the 1 point for making it to overtime which if they won in 
overtime would only increase to 2 points.   
 Measuring league parity requires that the three different scoring systems listed 
above be taken into account when measuring a value for an ideally balanced league.  
Measuring league parity involves computing the variance of end of season point totals. 
 
 











where, pij is the probability of outcome xi occurring under the jth scoring system.  The 

























% of Games 
Ending in a 
Over Time 
Loss 
       
System 1:  1917/18-
1998/99 
67420 42.89% 42.89% 14.22% 0% 





12136 43.62% 38.09% 12.84% 5.45% 



































 We can now calculate the expected point outcome for each scoring system in the 
NHL.  This section will proceed by first calculating probabilities for each game outcome, 
win, lose or draw then calculating the expected point outcome ȝx under each system.  
Once the expected point outcomes are calculated, the variance and standard deviation for 
each period is computed resulting in the equations for the ideal standard deviation of final 
standing point outcomes. 
 4.2.1 Scoring System 1.  Under system 1 the game ends in either a win a loss or a 
draw.  As noted in the literature review, Cain and Haddock (2006) compute a trinomial 
measure of league parity using the actual distribution of tie games.  The authors find that 
the case of the English Premier League ties occurred 24.59% of the time with wins and 
losses occurring 37.705% of the time.  Table 4.1 shows that tie games are less likely in 
the NHL occurring approximately 13.5% of the time on average.  It could be assumed, as 
Cain and Haddock (2006) do, that the historical distribution of game outcomes should 
play a role in determining what the outcome of any one game would be if both teams had 
an equal probability of winning, losing or tying.  In this paper I will choose not to use 
history as a guide and assume any one outcome, even tie games, is equally likely.  I 
believe this assumption is more in the spirit of the method developed by Fort (1992) in 
that the uncertainty of outcome is highest when each outcome has an equal probability of 
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1 winP   
(4.1.1)                                       
3
1 lossP   
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 4.2.2 Scoring System 2.  Under system 2 a regulation period can end in either a 
win a loss or a tie, similar to system 1, letting a win occur with
3
1 winp , a loss occurs 
with
3
1 lossp  and ties with 3
1 tiep .  Overtime is the result of a tie at the end of 
regulation.  Therefore in overtime each outcome (overtime win, overtime loss and 
overtime tie) again occurs with the same probabilities, as though a new game were started 





regulation, losing in overtime and tied at the end of overtime can be calculated as (4.1.5), 
























§  novertimewidrawregulationwinregulationwin PPPP   
(4.1.6)                                     
3
1  lossregulationloss PP  














§  Lossdrawregulationssovertimelo PPP  


















With 2 points for a win, 0 for a loss, 1 point for a draw at the end of overtime and 1 point 
for the team that loses in overtime the outcome x2 is then (4.1.9). 
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 4.2.3 Scoring System 3.  Under scoring system 3, no games end in a tie but 






1  are used, but when 




1   losswin pp .  The probability of each outcome 
occurring for system 3 can be calculated as follows in (4.1.11), (4.1.12) and (4.1.13). 
 
 




















§  novertimewidrawregulationwinregulationwin PPPP  
(4.1.12)                                     
3
1  lossregulationloss PP  














§  Lossdrawregulationssovertimelo PPP  
 
With 2 points for a win, 0 for a loss and 1 point for the team that loses in overtime the 
outcome x3 is then (4.1.14). 
 
 




The expected point outcome for period 3 is then (4.1.15). 
 
 

































 The next step in the calculation of the ideal standard deviation is to calculate the 
variance of each well balanced contest for each scoring system which can be done using 
the calculated expected point outcomes of (4.1.4), (4.1.10) and (4.1.15) as (4.1.16), 
4.1.17) and (4.1.18). 
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 When such well balanced contests occur over a season of g independent games 
then the variance, 2xjV , of the final point total for each jth scoring system is (4.1.19), 
(4.1.20) and (4.1.21). 
 
 
(4.1.19)                                        
3
22
1 gx  V  
(4.1.20)                                        
729
1662
2 gx  V  
(4.1.21)                                        
72
252








This then allows the ideal standard deviation, idealjV , to be calculated for each jth scoring 
system as (4.1.22), (4.1.23) and (4.1.24). 
 
 
(4.1.22)                                      gideal 3
2
1  V   
(4.1.23)                                      gideal 729
166
2  V   
(4.1.24)                                       gideal 72
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3  V  
 
 
 Similar to calculating the R measure, the distribution of wins in a sports league 
can be modeled as the deviation of the actual standard deviation of final point outcomes 
divided by the ideal standard deviation of final point outcomes, where the ideal is no 
longer binomial and changes depending on the structure of the scoring system.  
 
 
























V  refers to the actual standard deviation of 
points in the league under the jth scoring system, with POINTSi,t being the end of season 
point total for team i in year t and N being the number of games played by each team over 





 The adjusted competitive balance ratio, adjtR can then be calculated for each time 
period by calculating tactualV  for each year and then dividing this by jidealV calculated for 
each scoring system used during year t.  
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Table 4.2 reports the mean value of adjNHLtR  for each of the different scoring systems. 
From Table 4.2, scoring system 2 produced the lowest level of league parity by reporting 
the highest adjNHLtR for any of the time periods.  Calculating 
adjNHL
tR  for each year over the 
100 year history of the NHL, Figure 4.1, we see that the adjNHLtR is increasing over the 
course of NHL history implying a worsening of parity since the leagues inception.  The 
lowest level of league parity occurs under scoring system 2.  This could be due to the 
assumption of balanced probabilities. It could also be due to the structure of the scoring  
system.  Under scoring system 2 a team is awarded a point if they finish tied at the end of 







Mean values of adjNHLtR  for the NHL. 
Scoring System  Seasons Used Mean adjtR  Number of 
Observations 
    
System 1 1917/18-1998/99 2.44 82 
    
System 2 1999/00-2003/04 3.73 5 
    
System 3 2005/06-2007/08 2.69 3 

































































earned by winning is an insufficient incentive for players to try harder when without 
trying hard they are ensured of at least 1 point.   
 The only other period in the modern era (post 1950) in which league parity was as 
low as it was under scoring system 2 occurred in the 1970s which had a mean adjNHLtR  of 
3.2 (Figure 4.1).  The large adjtR  during the 1970s could be explained with talent 
decompression, the result of the rival World Hockey Association (WHA) from 1972-
1977, taking some players who would have been playing in the NHL.  In addition to the 
impact of the WHA, the NHL further decompressed by dramatically expanding the 
number of teams from 6 teams to 12 teams in 1967/68 then to 14 in 1970/71, 16 in  
the 1972/73 season and then to 18 in the 1974/75 season.  In 2000/01 the league 
expanded from 28 to 30 teams which, similar to the expansion of the 1970’s though less 
dramatic could, through talent decompression, be responsible for the positive spike in the 
adjNHL
tR  seen in the early 2000s.   
 If talent supply has an effect on league parity then we should see talent supply and 
league parity moving in opposite directions.  As the number of players from the Czech 
Republic and Russia increase we would expect, if the “Gould Hypothesis” holds, that 
adjNHL
tR  is decreasing.  Furthermore, a league wishing to maximize the uncertainty of 
outcome would construct policy geared toward this objective.  In 1962 the NHL held its 
first reverse order draft and in 1992 the NHL instituted free agency.  Do these policies 
have an impact on the distribution of wins in the NHL?  It is to this question that I now 







4.3   OLS Regression of Talent Supply in the NHL 
 An OLS regression can be used to asses if there is a relationship between talent 
supply, league policy and league parity in the NHL. 
 
 


















where adjNHLtR covers the 1917/18 season to the 2007/2008 season, WHA is a dummy 
variable for the rival World Hockey Association which was in existence from 1972-1977, 
%RUSSIAN and %CZECH/SLOVAK are the percentage of Russian, Czech and Slovakian  
players in the NHL in year t, FREE is a dummy variable = 1 for the years after 1992,  
DRAFT is a dummy = 1 for the years after 1962 and SYSTEMj is a dummy = 1 for the  
years in which the jth scoring system was used.  Two models are estimated, Model 1 
includes the dummy variables for scoring system 2 and scoring system 3 and Model 2 
drops the constant to allow for inclusion of the three scoring system dummies.  
The results from equation (4.2.0) are reported in Table 4.3. 
 Looking first at Model 1 we see, consistent with the talent decompression 
hypothesis, the years of the rival WHA league are positively related with the 
adjNHL
tR meaning that the distribution of wins in the NHL was more unequal during the 
years in which it was competing with the WHA for players.  The talent supply variables 
are significant and the two scoring system dummies are insignificant arguing that there is  







OLS estimates of equation (4.2.0) 
 MODEL 1 MODEL 2 
WHA 0.911** 0.971** 
 (3.19) (2.85) 
TEAMS -0.017 -0.000 
 (-0.84) 0 
%RUSSIAN 0.128 0.139 
 (1.21) (1.11) 
%CZECH/SLOVAK 0.033 0.086 
 (0.28) (0.62) 
FREE-AGENCY -0.973 -1.152 
 (-1.62) (-1.62) 
DRAFT 0.332 0.151 























Constant 2.395**  
 (15.34)  
Observations 90 90 
R-squared 0.33 0.94 








 In Model 2, when running the regression through the origin, the WHA variable is  
still significantly positive.  Again the talent supply variables are not significant but the  
scoring system dummies are.  When running the regression through the origin we would 
expect the scoring system dummies to be significantly different from 0 since the adjtR   
measure approaches 1 from above.  Furthermore, the large R-squared is to be expected  
when forcing a regression through the origin and cannot be interpreted in any meaningful  
way. 
 What do Models 1 and 2 tell us about the impact of talent compression and/or 
decompression on league parity?  In both models, the decompressing impact of the WHA  
has corresponded with a period of an unequal distribution of end of season point totals 
which allows us to say the obvious result that rival leagues are bad for business.  The 
uncertain outcome of any game is reduced when talent is distributed between two 
leagues.  The talent pool variables are not having an impact on league parity.  The sign of  
the insignificance of the free agency variable is consistent with the accepted wisdom,  
Rottenberg (1956) argued that free agency would be ineffective while team owners  
argued that it would negatively affect the equal distribution of wins.  Rodney Fort (2011) 
sums up the sides: 
 The invariance principal predicts that competitive balance is the same 
 whether the talent market is competitive or governed by the reserve clause.  
 If the league is imbalanced to start with, it will be equally imbalanced in 
 either case.  This is directly opposite of what owners predicted would 
 happen. (p. 261)   
 
 This discussion is primarily concerned with talent supply effects and it seems that  
in the case of expanding the size of the talent pool the level of league parity was not  





decompression, as we see with the WHA, seems to correspond to periods of less equal  
distribution of wins.  The question still remains about causality in the case of Russian  
and Czech and Slovak players.  The next section addresses this question. 
 
4.4   Measuring Parity in the REL and CRL 
 Estimation of equation (4.2.0) provides some evidence of a link between the 
supply of talented athletes and parity within that league.  Further analysis of other leagues 
could be informative to try and assess if there is a one way relationship between league 
parity and talent supply.  Turning next to league parity in the REL and CRL we again see 
three different scoring systems.  The first system is identical to that of system 1 in the 
NHL where a win is worth 2 points a loss 0 points and a tie worth 1 point.  This system 
was used in the REL from the 1978/79 season to the 1998/99 season and the CRL from 
1987/88 to 2000/01.  To analyze competitive balance in the REL and CRL two additional 
scoring systems, system 4 and system 5, will have to be calculated.  System 4 counts a 
regulation win as 3 points, an overtime win is worth 2 while an overtime loss or an 
overtime tie are both  worth 1 while a regulation loss is worth 0 points.  System 4 was  
adopted in the REL from the 1999/00 season to the 2005/06 season and from the 2001/02 
season to the 2005/06 in the CRL.  System 5, used from the 2006/07 season to present in 
both the REL and the CRL eliminates tie games with a shootout and counts a regulation 
win as 3 points, an overtime win is worth 2 points and an overtime loss is worth 1 point 
and as usual a regulation loss is worth 0 points.  Table 4.4 and Table 4.5 report the mean 












% of Games 
Ending in a win 
% of Games 
Ending in a Loss 
% of Games 
Ending in a 
Draw 
      
System 1 1978/79-
1998/99 
15547 43.22% 43.22% 13.6% 
      
CRL      
      
System 1 1987/88-
2000/01 
8675 41.61% 41.61% 16.77% 
      




























































7294 39.8% 3.81% 39.8% 3.81% 12.78% 





4968 39.63% 10.35% 39.63% 10.35% 0 
        
CRL        





3628 39.83% 5.13% 39.83% 5.13% 10.10% 





2912 38.67% 11.33% 38.67% 11.33% 0 
















 Table 4.4 shows that a game ending in a draw is more likely in the CRL than in 
the REL and the NHL (Table 4.1).  If it is considered that a draw is evidence of two 
evenly matched teams then the high percentage of draws in the CRL could be some  
indication that parity in the CRL is higher than in the REL and the NHL during the time 
when scoring system 1 was implemented in all three leagues.  Table 4.5 shows that once 
the two leagues switched to scoring system 4, the percentage of draw games was higher 
in the REL compared to the CRL.  Scoring system 4 in the REL and CRL is similar to 
that of system 2 in the NHL, which under this system experienced draw games 12.84% of 
the time which now exceeds that of the REL and CRL.  The scoring system used in the 
REL from1978/79-1998/99 and the CRL from 1987/88-2000/01 is identical to scoring 
system 1 used in the NHL from 1917 to 1998 while the later systems require further 
computation.  Being the same as equation (5.0), adjRELR 981978  and 
adjCRLR 001987 can be written as 
(4.3.0) and (4.3.1). 
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 4.4.1 Scoring System 4.  Under system 4, in place in the REL from 1999/00 to 
2005/06 and in the CRL from 2001/02 to 2005/06, a regulation period can end in either a 





probability.  Unlike in the NHL, winning in overtime is worth less, 2 points than winning 
in regulation, 3 points resulting in the need to calculate the probability of an overtime 
win.  The probabilities of each outcome occurring can be calculated as (4.3.4), (4.3.5), 
(4.3.6), (4.3.7) and (4.3.8). 
 
 
(4.3.4)                                        
3
1 winregulationP                 
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3
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§  Lossdrawregulationssovertimelo PPP  














§  drawdrawregulationawovertimedr PPP  
 
 
with 3 points for a win, 2 points for an overtime win, 0 for a loss, 1 point for the team that 











































































































































(4.3.12)                                     gx 729
389
4  V  (10.8) 
 
 
For the two leagues, the REL and CRL, the adjtR for scoring system 4 can then be 
calculated by computing: 
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 4.4.2 Scoring System 5.  Finally, scoring system 5 eliminates tie games by 
employing a shootout at the end of the overtime period but maintains a reduced point 
total for winning in overtime as opposed to winning in regulation.  The probability of 
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(4.3.19)                                      OTlossOTwinwinx  235   
 
 
This yields the expected point outcome for scoring system 5 is (4.3.20). 
 
 









































With a variance, (4.3.21). 
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(4.3.22)                                      gx 6
5
5  V   
 
 
For the two leagues, the REL and CRL, the adjtR for scoring system 5 can then be 
calculated by computing (4.3.23) and (4.3.24). 
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 Table 4.6 reports the mean values adjRELR 20091978  and
adjCZECHR 091987  for each of the different 
scoring systems.  Over the history of the two leagues, the CRL has been significantly2 
more balanced than the REL.  In both leagues parity under scoring system 4 yielded 
significantly3
adjRELR 20091978
 worse parity than any of the other scoring systems.  Figure 4.2 graphs 
yearly values of  and adjCZECHR 091987 .  Similar to the NHL league parity has been 
worsening on average and the early 1990s appear to be a time of generally decreasing 
parity.  Talent decompression in the two leagues could be playing a role as more Czech 
and Russian players emigrated to the NHL. 
 Finally, Table 4.7 shows the mean values of adjtR for all three leagues.  The REL 
has the highest average adjtR  for the three leagues with the NHL second and the CRL 
coming in at third.  The next section will use Granger causality to test for a causal 
relationship between talent supply and league parity.  
 
 
4.5  Granger Causality and the Direction of Talent Supply Effects 
 
 Using adjtR  as a measure of parity we can now test the hypothesis that parity is 
affected by the size of the talent pool.  If an increase in talent supply improves parity 
between teams then we should see a decrease in the adjtR  measure in the NHL (i.e., more 
parity) and an increase in the REL and CRL (i.e., less parity) due to the emigration of 
talented hockey players from Russia and the Czech Republic to the NHL.   
 
 
                                                 
2 A t-test on the means of adjRELR 20091978 and
adjCZECHR 091987 yields t = 4.60. 
 






Mean values of adjtR  for the REL and CRL 
Scoring System  Seasons Used Mean adjtR  Number of 
Observations 
    
REL    
    
System 1 1978/79-1998/99 3.08 21 
    
System 4 1999/00-2005/06 4.33 7 
    
System 5 2006/07-2009/10 3.08 4 
    
All Years 1978/79-2009/10 3.36 32 
    
CRL    
    
System 1 1987/88-2000/01 2.00 14 
    
System 4 2001/02-2005/06 3.66 5 
    
System 5 2006/07-2009/10 2.12 4 
    
All Years 1987/88-2009/10 2.38 23 
Notes:  Final standing points totals from HockeyDB.com.   During the 1980s, the REL 
 employed a relegation system in which  four teams were relegated midway 
 through the season, subsequently within a season the number of games played for 
 these four teams is less than that of the non-relegated teams.  To handle this 
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Figure 4.2: Fitted values of adjRELR 20091978  and
adjCZECHR 091987 . 

























Average adjtR  for the NHL, REL and CRL 




























































 Following Granger (1969) we can test the direction of causality for a two-variable 
model with the two equations in (iv): 
 
 





























It can then be said that Yt is Granger causing Xt if ȕj is significantly different from zero 
and Xt is Granger causing Yt if ȡj is significantly different from zero (Granger, 1969).  If 
both cases occur then the system is said to be a feedback system while a direction of 
causality is implied when either one or the other occurs, for instance if ȕj is significantly 
different from zero and ȡj is not then the direction of causality is implied to run from Yt to 
Xt and not from Xt to Yt .4
 To test whether or not talent supply Granger causes league parity in the NHL the 
following systems of equations, (4.4.0), (4.4.1) and (4.4.2) will be estimated. 
    
 
 

























where adjNHLtR  is the measure of competitive balance computed for the NHL for the years 
1917 to 2008.  Talent supply changes in the NHL are now measured using the total 
                                                 
4 Green notes that one can infer Granger Causality “when lagged values of a variable, say 
xt, have explanatory power in a regression of a variable yt on lagged values of yt and xt” 






number of players playing NHL and who were born outside Canada or the United States 
in the NHL in year t, NON_NAt as opposed to the use of percentage of players in the 
previous study.  We would expect that if an increase in the size of the talent pool Granger 
caused an increase in league parity then 1U  should be negative and significant. 
 To test for a reduction in league parity due to talent decompression, the focus will 
be on Russian and Czechoslovakian players leaving their respective home countries.  
Talent decompression will be measured using the total number of players playing in the 
NHL in year t and who were born in Russia or Czechoslovakia, RUSt and Czecht 
respectively.  These would be professional players who would have potentially played in 
a league in their home country, but emigrated out of their home country, Russia or 
Czechoslovakia, to play in the NHL. The variable Czecht includes players, who after 
1993, were born in Slovakia and players born in the Czech Republic.  League parity will 
be measured using the computed measure of competition, adjRELtR  and 
adjCRL
tR  , for the 
REL and CRL respectively.  The two systems of equations for the REL and CRL are then 
(4.4.1) and (4.4.2). 
 
 










































 In equations, (4.4.1) and (4.4.2), if talent decompression Granger causes a 





condition for Granger causality is that the variables involved be stationary.  Table 4.8 
reports the results of testing for a unit root of the relevant variables using an augmented 
Dickey Fuller test.  Looking at Table 4.8 we see that many of the variables are 
nonstationary (taking significantly different from zero at the 5% level to indicate 
stationarity), but when first differenced become stationary, suggesting an integration of 
order one5 adjCRLtR for the variables: , NON-NAt, RUSt, CZECHt.  Before testing for 
Granger causality, the nonstationary variables are first differenced (denoted with ¨



































































 The results of the regressions in (4.4.3), (4.4.4) and (4.4.5) are reported in Table 
4.9.  For the purposes of this paper, the significance of the coefficient ȡ1 is of primary  
interest and in all cases this coefficient is insignificant at the 5% level indicating that 
changes in the talent supply, be they increases in the talent supply, 1_ ' tNANON  or 
decreases in the talent supply, 1' tRUS  or 1' tRUS , do not Granger cause levels of 
league parity in the case of the NHL, REL or CRL.   
                                                 






Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests 
 ADF Statistic  ADF Statistic 
    
adjNHL
tR *** -5.453 NON_NAt 0.475 
    
adjNHLR' *** -11.589 ¨NON_NA*** -5.184 
    
adjCRL
tR  -2.054 CZECH 1.052 
    
adjCRLR' *** -5.0804 ¨CZECH *** -7.220 
    
adjREL
tR ** -3.34 RUS -0.420 
    
adjRELR' *** -7.761 ¨RUS *** -5.004 




















&RHIILFLHQWVȕ2 DQGȡ1, testing for Ganger Causality 
Dependant variable 
 
Coefficient for ȕ2 Coefficient for ȡ1 Observations 
    
¨NON_NA -1.99  86 
 (-1.3)   
    
adjNHL
tR   0.011 86 
  (1.88)  
    
¨RUS -3.73**  28 
 (-2.16)   
    
adjREL
tR   -0.01 28 
  (-0.7)  
    
¨CZECH -2.76  16 
 (-0.57)   
    
adjCRLR'   0.02 16 
  (1.16)  















 There is a significant result on the 2E  coefficient for the REL.  It appears to be 
the case that changes in league parity in the REL Granger cause changes in the  
emigration patterns of Russian players to the NHL.  In this case, as adjRELtR 1  increases (i.e., 
as the league becomes less competitive), the number of Russian players entering the NHL 
declines or as the league becomes more competitive the number of Russian players 
entering the NHL increases.  Looking at Figure 4.2 there has been a decrease in the level 
of competition in the REL since the late 1970s, so as the REL becomes less competitive 
the change in the number of Russian players playing in the REL is Granger caused to 
decline.  It could be the case that as Russia experienced economic turmoil in the wake of 
the collapse of communism, which corresponds with the time frame of worsening parity, 
Russia was producing fewer potential professional hockey players.  When one is 
struggling economically, the luxury of participating in sports would be expected to 
decline thereby causing the pool of talented Russian players to shrink.   
 
4.6  Conclusion 
 The adjusted competitive balance ratio, adjtR , extends the standard deviation ratio 
to handle leagues which count the game outcome of a draw in end of season point totals.  
The calculated adjtR ’s  for the National Hockey League, the Russian Elite League and the 
Czech Republic League demonstrate a trend toward worsening parity in each league over 
the leagues’ history.  Parity in the NHL was at its worst during the 1970s and early 
2000s.  The 1970s corresponds to the time frame in which the World Hockey Association 





supply.  As demonstrated in Table (4.2) the WHA variable was positive and significant 
consistent with talent decompression reducing league parity.  
 The cause of the low levels of league parity in the NHL in the early 2000s is still 
indeterminate.  With free agency established in 1992, two different scoring systems and a 
relative decrease in the percentage of NHL players born outside of North America there 
are many potential drivers.  The “Gould Hypothesis” would suggest that the increasing 
percentage of foreign born players would have driven down the adjusted R measure of 
competitive balance and through talent decompression the relative decrease in the 
percentage of foreign born players after 2000 would have driven up the adjusted R.  If 
talent supply has an effect on league parity then the coefficient estimates of the 
percentage of Russian and Czechoslovakian players should have been negatively related 
to the adjusted R.  To test for a causal relationship going from talent supply to league 
parity, Granger Causality testing is employed.  If talent compression/decompression 
Granger causes adjtR  then there would be a significant causal relationship and if this 
causality were negative it could be argued that increasing the size of the talent pool was 
acting to increase league parity, but this does not appear to be the case.   
 The results of this research are that talent decompression could reduce league 
parity, like we saw with the WHA.  It is possible that the talent supply needs to be 
diffused by a fairly large amount for it to have a significant affect.  We see large scale 
decompression in the case of rival leagues, for example we would expect that league 
parity in the NFL would be relatively lower between 1960 and 1969 and 1983 to 1987 
due to the rival American Football League (before the merger) and the rival United States 





talent compressing effects on league parity are inconclusive.  Insignificant results of 
Granger Causality testing argue that there is no significant effect of talent supply on 












VENUS VERSUS SERENA:  A GENERALIZED  
PERFORMANCE ENHANCING DRUG  
GAME IN TWO ACTS 
 
 
5.1   Introduction 
 
 In this chapter I will develop the Performance Enhancing Drug Game in Haugan 
(2002), but where Haugan assumes the payoff to the loser is zero when the certainty of 
the doped athlete winning is equal to 1, I suggest a generalization by adding in a payoff to 
the loser that can be acquired if the doped athlete is caught and disqualified.  I will further 
develop the game into a four-player, two-stage tournament style game such as can be 
found in tennis tournaments to analyze how athlete strategies change when an athlete has 
a lower probability of winning the final game since she has to win both the first game and 
the second game and has a higher probability of being caught doping since she will have 
a probability of being caught in the first game and the second game.  The multistage 
tournament format will be used to compare the incentive effects of differing reward 
schemes, comparing the highly nonlinear reward scheme seen in professional tennis 
tournaments with the more evenly distributed reward scheme seen in NASCAR. 
 Section 1 establishes the rules of the game.  Section 2 and 3 determine pure 
strategy Nash Equilibrium conditions for the final and semifinal matches.  Section 4 
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determines pure strategy Nash equilibrium conditions for the tournament game.  Section 
5 discusses and Section 6 concludes. 
 
5.2   The Tournament Game 
 The Tournament Performance Enhancing Drug game will follow from the basic 
assumptions outlined in Haugan (2004). 
x Two athletes (of equal strength) compete against each other in some sports event. 
x The athletes’ possible strategic choices are to use or not use dope.  Hence, we 
assume only one available drug. 
x The drug is assumed effective-that is, if one agent takes the drug and the other 
does not, the “drug taker” wins the competition with certainty.  The drug is also 
assumed to have an equal effect on both athletes.  That is, if both athletes take the 
drug then they are equal in strength. 
x Both agents must decide (simultaneously) before the competition to take the drug. 
x These decisions are not repeated.  Hence we define a “one-shot” simultaneous 
game. 
x The agents’ payoffs are defined according to three interesting outcomes for each 
agent. 
- W:  Agent i wins the competition. 
- L:  Agent i loses the competition. 
- E:  Agent i is exposed as a drug abuser.  
(Haugan, 2004, pp. 70-71) 
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 The Tournament game makes these basic assumptions of Haugan then further 
extends the game to four players playing in a tournament, whereby all four players 
compete in two, one-on-one Qualifyings Rounds, each player plays only one game and 
the winners of the Qualifying Rounds go on to the Finals’ Round while the losers in the 
Qualifying Round go on to the Losers’ Round.1
 The prizes and fine for being caught doping can be represented as multiples of the 
first place prize, let aA=A, bA=B, dA=D and fA=A, where a=1>b>d>f and cA=C where 
c > 0.  Even though, a = 1 in all cases, the author believes maintaining the notation 
allows for a more straight forward exposition of the expected payouts.  Parameterizing 
the payouts allows for ready substitution of any particular reward scheme and in the case 
of the cost of doping, parameterization enhances the realism of the game, in that in most 
sporting organizations, the penalty for doping is usually a suspension without pay as 
opposed to a flat cost of some amount for all athletes.  This becomes particularly relevant 
in sports where salaries are not very evenly distributed.  For example Los Angeles 
  There are no prizes awarded at the end 
of the Qualifying Rounds; the tournament prizes are awarded at the end of the Finals’ 
Round and the Losers’ Round.  The Finals’ Round winner receives the first place prize of 
A, and the Finals’ Round loser receives the second place prize B.  The Losers’ Round 
winner receives the third place prize D, and the Losers’ Round loser receives the fourth 
place prize of F.  It is also assumed that the drugs are banned by the sporting organization 
and if a player is caught using the drugs she will be fined at a value of C, C > 0 and she 
has a probability of getting caught equal to r.   
                                                 
1 Vince Lombardi famously said, “There is only one place in my game, and that's first 
place. I have finished second twice in my time at Green Bay, and I don't ever want to 
finish second again. There is a second place bowl game, but it is a game for losers played 
by losers” (1-Famous-Quotes.com).  
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Dodgers star hitter Manny Ramirez was suspended for 50 games in 2009 for violating 
league drug policies, Manny’s contract was for $45 million over 2 years or $22.5 million 
per season which works out about $138,888 per game which means his suspension cost 
him $6.9 million (=$138,888x50).  Contrast this with Sergio Mitre, a pitcher for the 
Yankees who has a salary of $850,000 for the 2010 season and was also suspended for 50 
games.  Sergio’s cost of doping was $5,247 per game for a total of $262,346 
(=$5,247x50).  It would probably be considered excessive to fine Sergio $6.9 million and 
it would probably be ineffective to fine Manny $264,346.  On the other hand if the cost of 
doping were pegged to the player’s prize (as it is with a suspension without pay where, 
cA=C) then we could say that MLB thinks that a 31% loss in salary 
(=.31=$6.9million/$22.5million for Manny and .31=$262,346/$850,000 for Sergio) is a 
sufficient2
 Analysis of the Performance Enhancing Drug Tournament Game will be 
developed by beginning with the Finals’ Round and Losers’ Round to establish the 
expected payouts for the Qualifying Rounds.  
 fine to establish a doping disincentive.    
 
5.3   The Finals’ 
 The analysis begins with the Final Round and the expected payouts for given 
player strategies are as follows. 
 {ND, ND}:  If each player chooses not-dope, (ND) then each player has an equal 
probability of winning the tournament and receiving the first place prize of aA.  In 
                                                 
2 Apparently it was not sufficient for either of these guys, but that is beside the point. 
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addition each player has an equal probability of obtaining second place and receiving the 




















 {D, ND}:  If player 1 chooses dope, (D) while player 2 chooses not to dope then 
player 1 will win with certainty and receive the first place prize of aA but also has the 
chance, r of being caught and fined cA, resulting in an expected payoff: 
 ArcarcAaA   .  If player 1 chooses dope while player 2 chooses not-dope then 
player 2 will win the second place prize bA with certainty and has no probability of being 
caught3 doping.  In addition there is the off chance4
 ArabraAbA  
, r, that player 1 will be caught doping 
and subsequently disqualified, thus player 2 has a probability r of obtaining the winning 
payoff aA.  If it is assumed that the match outcome and test outcome are independent 
then athlete 2’s expected payoff if athlete 1 chooses to dope is then .  




(P2)    {D, ND}: {  Arca  ,  Arab   } 
                                                 
3 This is assuming no false positives occur.  An extension could be to include false 
positives to the nondoper.   
 
4 This may not happen all that often but it does happen.  For example, the second place 
rider Oscar Pereiro won the 2006 Tour de France due to the disqualification of Floyd 
Landis.  One way to think about this with team sports, for example, would be the first 
string player is suspended for some number of games allowing the second string player 
the opportunity to show her skills. 
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 {D,D}:  If both players choose dope then they each have a 0.5 probability of 
winning aA or a 0.5 probability of getting 2nd place and getting bA only if they are both 
not caught which happens with a probability of (1-r)2 resulting in an expected monetary 
payoff:   
2
)1( 2rbaA 
.  It could also be the case that one player is caught while the 
other is not which happens with a (1-r)r probability and expected monetary payoff to the 
player that is not caught: aA(1-r)r. On the other hand, it could also be the case that the 
doped player is caught while the other is not resulting in an expected monetary loss to the  
player caught: - cA(1-r)r. Both players are caught with probability r2 and expected 




(P3)                {D,D}:         
      
      
    









































































The Final Round of the Tournament performance enhancing drug game is represented by 























    

























































Figure 5.1: The Finals’ game matrix.  













 The dominant strategy5
 
 for a player in the Finals’ Round will be determined by 
the relationships expressed in (5.1.0) and (5.1.1). 
 
 
(5.1.0)                     ¸¸¹
·
¨¨©

















    
























Then the strictly dominant strategy for player i will be (D) and with symmetric payouts, 
the strictly dominant strategy for all players will be (D) and there will be a Nash 
equilibrium at {D, D}. 
 On the other hand, if 
 
 




















1 2  
                                                 
5 The dominant is defined according to Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green (1995), in 
definition 8.B.1. “Definition 8.B.1:  A strategy ii Ss   is a strictly dominant strategy for 
player i in game ^ `  ^ `> @x * ii uSIN ,,  if for all ii ss z' , we have  
       iiiiii ssussu  ! ,, '  
For all ii Ss   .” 
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Then the strictly dominant strategy for player i will be (ND) and with symmetric payouts, 
the strictly dominant strategy for all players will be (ND) and there will be a Nash 
equilibrium at {ND, ND}. 
 The dominant pure strategies depend on the expected cost of doping (rc) and the 
value of the prizes.  The pure strategy regions can be established by plotting the 
relationships in (5.1.0) and (5.1.1) on the (r,c) plane.  Setting the two sides of (5.1.0) 














































































We can establish the condition for a strictly dominant doping strategy, (D,D) from (5.1.2)  
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as condition 1. 
 
 














31 22  then the strictly dominant strategy for both 
           players is to choose dope and assuming rational players, the Nash      
           equilibrium is at {D, D}. 
 
 
By equation, (5.1.6), if Condition 1 is satisfied then the game is a Prisoners Dilemma. 
We can establish the condition for a strictly dominant not-doping strategy, (ND,ND) from 
(5.1.3) as condition 2. 
 
 














 then the strictly dominant strategy for both players is to 
           choose not-dope and assuming rational players, the Nash equilibrium is at   




 To find the strictly dominant strategy for player i we need to find the strategy si 
with the maximum payoff for any strategy that player i’s rivals might play.  In order to do 
this we can first produce values of a and b then plot (5.1.4) and (5.1.5) on the (r,c) plane 
to determine the strictly dominant strategies on the (r,c) plane.  Looking to the 2009 US  
Open6 for values of a and b.  The 2009 US Open7
                                                 
6 The US Open Data were gleaned from the Official Website of the 2011 US Open: 
http://www.usopen.org/News/2009/07/2009_US_Open_Base_Prize_Money_Increases/  
 had a first place prize of $1.6 million, a 




finalists received $175,000.  For the tournament game we then have 1st place prize = $1.6 
million, 2nd place=$800,000, 3rd place8
 
=$350,000 and 4th place=$175,000.  The prizes 
and associated cost of doping can be represented as parameters of the 1st place prize, Let: 
aA=A, bA=B, dA=D, fA=F and cA=C where, 0<f<d<b<1 and c>0.  In the specific case 
of the US Open we then have: 
 
 
  1st place = aA = A = $1.6 million and a = 1 
  2nd place = bA=B = $800,000, and 5.0
000,600,1$
000,800$   b  
  3rd place= dA = D= $350,000 and, 219.0
000,600,1$
000,350$   d  
  4th place = fA = F=$175,000 and, 109.0
000,600,1$
000,175$   f  
  The cost of doping = cA = C 
 
Substituting into equations (5.1.4) and (5.1.5) the US Open parameters, where a = 1 and 
b=.5, gives Figure (5.2). 
 Looking at Figure 5.2, (r,c) points to the left of the red line (equation 5.1.4) will, 
by Condition 1, produce a {D,D} Nash equilibrium.  While (r,c) points to the right of the  
                                                                                                                                                 
7 This reward scheme is fairly common in professional tennis tournaments, for example 
Wimbledon (2009) has £850,000 for the winner, £425,000 for the runner up, £212,000 
for the semi-finalists, £106,250 for the quarter-finalists. 
 
8 Third and fourth place would normally each receive $350,000, but for the purposes of 
generalization the semifinalist prize is the 3rd place prize and the quarterfinalist prize is 
the 4th place prize.   
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blue line (equation 5.1.5) will, by Condition 2, produce a produce a {ND,ND} Nash 
equilibrium.  The grey area in Figure 5.2 is unstable and will be discussed below.  We 
can see three (r,c) combinations from Figure 5.2 which lay in the three regions, fixing r = 
0.16, and assuming specific increases in c, we get (r,c) points in each region, (r,c) = (0.16, 
1) is in the {D,D} region to the left of equation (5.1.4), (r,c) = (0.16, 1.5) is in the grey  
area between (5.1.4) and (5.1.5) and (r,c) = (0.16, 2) is in the {ND,ND} region to the 
right of equation (5.1.5).  Substituting these (r,c) combinations into the Finals’ game 
matrix (Figure 5.1) gives three possible strategies for the players.  Looking first in the 
{D,D} region, (to the left of the red line in Figure 5.2), which would correspond to the 
payoff matrix in Figure 5.3 with (r,c) = (0.16, 1).  For any choice of player 2, player 1’s 
strategy is to choose D, if player 2 chose D then D would be the dominant strategy for 
player 1 since 0.71 > 0.66 and if player 2 chose ND then D would be the dominant  
strategy for player 1 since 0.84 > 0.75.  The strictly dominant strategy for player 1 is D 
and by symmetry the strictly dominant strategy for player 2 is D.  The Nash equilibrium 
for parameters (a,b,r,c) = (1,0.5,0.16,1) is {D,D}.  With these parameters the game is a 
Prisoners Dilemma, since both players would be better off if they cooperated and both 
chose ND, getting a payout of 0.75 as opposed to the lower payoff of 0.71. 
 Jumping to the {ND,ND} region, (a,b,r,c) = (1,0.5,0.16,2), Figure 5.4, we get a 
Nash equilibrium at {ND,ND} since no matter what choice player 2 makes, player 1 will 
choose ND.  With these parameters, the Nash equilibrium at {ND,ND} is also the Pareto 
optimal equilibrium with 0.75 being the largest expected payout possible for the players. 
 If (r,c) is in the grey area, (r,c) = (0.16, 1.5), Figure 5.5 then there is no dominant 










































Figure 5.3:  Finals’ game payout matrix with (r,c) = (0.16, 1),  
















































Figure 5.4:  Finals’ game payout matrix with (r,c) = (0.16, 2).  

















since 0.66 > 0.55 and if player 2 chose ND, the utility maximizing strategy for player 1 is 
D since 0.76 > 0.75.  Points in the grey area comprise a situation in which there is no 
pure strategy equilibrium, but since some strategy must be chosen (i.e., a player has to 
either choose to use PEDs or not) each player has to play dope or not-dope with some 
probability not equal to 0.   
 Points in the grey area of Figure 5.2 lay to the right of (5.1.4) and to the left of 
(5.1.5) and as such produce unstable results in the off diagonals of the Finals’ Game 
matrix of Figure 5.1. 
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Figure 5.5:  Finals’ game payout matrix with (r,c) = (0.16, 1.5).  


















 Player 1 will choose ND if player 2 chooses D and player 1 will choose D if 
player 1 chooses ND.  In the absence of a pure strategy equilibrium for (r,c) in the grey 
area of Figure 5.2 we can find a mixed strategy equilibrium9
 
 if we allow players to 
randomize their strategies.  The realism of mixed strategy equilibriums has been called 
into question.  Rapoport and Boebel (1992), Mookherjee and Sopher (1994) and Ochs 
(1995) find little empirical evidence that players actually do play mixed strategies.  One 
could certainly suppose that a person’s choice of whether or not to use PEDs would not 
be done randomly, so the validity of the actual probabilities of choosing dope or not-
dope, established by the assumption of players randomizing their decisions in the 
performance enhancing drug game could be called into question.  We can use the pure 
strategy regions to gain some information about a players choices if (r,c) occurs in the 
grey region by noting that in the absence of a not-doping dominant pure strategy, a player 
will choose (D) with 0 < probability < 1 and in the absence of a dominant doping pure 
strategy, a player will choose (ND) with 0 < probability < 1.  The relevance of this point 
will come into play when discussing an organizing body’s policy choices to deter doping.  
It would certainly be a better outcome for an organizing body wishing to deter doping 
that athlete’s would choose not-dope with certainty over dope with probability > 0.  We 
can then establish Condition 3. 
 


























31 22  then all players will choose           
           D with 0 < probability < 1 and ND with 0 < probability < 1. 
                                                 
9 If players are assumed to randomize their strategies then the mixed strategy Nash 
equilibrium for (r,c)=(0.16,1.5) is at (D, ND) = (0.22, 0.78). 
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5.4   Losers’ Game 
 The payout matrix and Nash equilibrium conditions for the Losers’ Round can be 
determined by substituting dA for aA from the Finals’ Round and fA for bA from the 
Finals’ Round. The 2x2 matrix, Figure 5.6 shows the expected payouts for the Losers’ 
Round the Losers’ game. 
 Similar to the Finals’ game, the dominant strategies in the Qualifying Round 




(5.2.0)         ¸¸¹
·
¨¨©















 As above we can set both sides of equations (5.2.0) and (5.2.1) equal and solve 
for c to get (5.2.2) and (5.2.3) which are plotted on (r,c) in Figure 5.7 using the US Open 
reward scheme where d = 0.219 and f = 0.109.  
 














31 22  








































    



























































Figure 5.6: Losers’ game matrix. 
























Using the analysis above for the Finals’ Round allows us to establish Condition 4 and 


















31 22  then the strictly for both players is choose           






















 then the strictly for both players is choose not-dope    





As above, the grey area produces off diagonal unstable results and by the above argument 






























31 22  then all players will   





5.5   Qualifiers 
 The Qualifying Round would consist of two games in which four different players 
competed one-on-one against each other.  Assuming all players are perfectly rational and 
equally skilled, the Qualifying Round can be modeled as one game but payoffs need to be 
recalculated to reflect the greater number of potential outcomes in the rounds which 
fROORZ/HWɥEHWKHSUL]HIRUZLQQLQJWKHQualifying Round, namely the expected payoff 
from the Finals’ 5RXQG/HWȝEHWKHSUL]HIRUORVLQJLQWKHQualifying Round, namely 
the expected payoffs from the Losers’ Round.  Later the values of aA, bA, dA and fA can 
be substituted back in.     
  {ND, ND}:  Each player has an equal probability of winning the Qualifying 
5RXQGZLWKDQH[SHFWHGSD\RXWRIɥ(DFKSOD\HUDOVRKDVDQHTXDOSUREDELOLW\RI
moving on to the Losers’ 5RXQGZLWKDQH[SHFWHGSD\RXWRIȝ7here is also the chance 
that one player from the other Qualifying Round will be disqualified while the other is 
not which will guarantee a 3rd place prize to the losers of the Qualifying Round of D with 
(1-r)r probability and expected payout of (1-r)rD.  If both players from the other 
Qualifying Round are disqualified which happens with probability r2 then the loser of the 
Qualifying Round moves to the Finals’ 5RXQGZLWKH[SHFWHGSD\RXWɥ7KHH[SHFWHG






















 {D, ND}:  If player 1 chooses dope while player 2 chooses not-dope then player 1 
will win with certainty and move on to the Finals’ 5RXQGZLWKH[SHFWHGSD\RXWɥEXW
due to doping, also has the chance, r of being caught in the first round10
  rrrDr SSP  21
 and fined C, 
UHVXOWLQJLQDQH[SHFWHGSD\RXWɥ – rC.  If player 1 chooses dope while player 2 chooses 
not-dope then player 2 has no probability of being caught doping in the first round and 
will move onto the Losers’ RRXQGZLWKDQH[SHFWHGSD\RXWRIȝLISOD\HULVQRWFDXJKW
doping.  If player 1 is caught doping then player 2 will move on to compete in the Finals’ 
Round, so player 2 has a probability r RIREWDLQLQJWKHZLQQLQJSD\RIIɥ7KHUHLVDJDLQ
the chance that one player from the other Qualifying Round will be disqualified while the 
other is not which will guarantee a 3rd place prize of D with (1-r)r probability and 
expected payout of (1-r)rD or both players from the other Qualifying Round are 
disqualified, which happens with probability r2DQGDFKDQFHWRZLQWKHILQDOSUL]HRIɥ
If it is assumed that the match outcome and test outcome are independent then player 2’s 
expected payoff if athlete 1 chooses dope is then, .  The expected 








 {D,D}:  If both players choose dope then they each have a 0.5 probability of 
winning and moving on to the Finals’ ZLWKH[SHFWHGSD\RXWɥ%XWVLQFHWKHGUXJ
                                                 




affects each equally they each have a 0.5 probability of losing in the Qualifier Round and 
moving onto the Losers’ 5RXQGIRUDQH[SHFWHGSD\RXWRIȝ7KLVLVWKHFDVHRQO\LI 





)1( 22 rr  PS .  It could also be the case that one player is caught while 
the other is not which happens with a (1-r)r probability and expected payout to the player 
WKDWLVQRWFDXJKWRIɥ(1-r)r. On the other hand, it could also be the case that one doped 
player is caught while the other is not resulting in an expected monetary loss to the player 
caught of, - C(1-r)r.  Both athletes are caught with probability r2 and expected monetary 
loss: -Cr2.  Of course, the other Qualifying Round needs to be taken into account as well.   
 If one or the other player is caught and disqualified in the other Qualifying 
Round, which happens with (1-r)r probability then the player who loses in the qualifiers 
will be guaranteed the 3rd place prize of D, while if both the other players are caught and 
disqualified she will move onto the Finals’ Round with probability r2 DQGSD\RXWRIɥ 
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We can then use these payouts to establish the 2x2 game matrix for the Qualifying 
Round, Figure 5.8.  Like the Finals’ and Losers’ Round, dominant strategies are 








:1 222 PSSSP  










Setting the two sides of (5.3.1) and (5.3.2) equal and solving for C, (5.3.1) becomes 
(5.3.3) and (5.3.2) becomes (5.3.4). 
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 The values of (5.3.3) and (5.3.4) determine the player strategies in the Qualifying 
Round but the values of the right hand side of (5.3.3) and (5.3.4) are determined by the 
player’s strategies in the Finals’ Round and the Losers’ Round.  We need to determine 
the values of (r,c) and the associated player doping strategies for the following rounds 
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Figure 5.8: Game matrix for the Qualifying Round.  















5.6   Expected Cost Regions 
 Assuming only pure strategy equilibriums within each game there are three 
potential player strategies for three (r,c) regions.  
Region (i):  The expected cost of doping, rc is large enough such that both players     
        choose not-dope and thus guarantees a strictly dominant pure strategy of ND             
         for both players. 
 
Region (ii):  The expected cost of doping, rc is small enough such that both players    
         choose dope and thus guarantees a strictly dominant pure strategy of D for     
          both players. 
Region (iii):  The expected cost of doping, rc is large enough such that both players   
          choose ND in the Losers’ Round but the expected cost of doping is small   
          enough such that both players choose dope in the Finals’.  In Region (iii)   
          there is a strictly dominant strategy of ND in the Losers’ Round and a 
strictly           dominant strategy of D in the Finals’ Round. 
Furthermore, since in the vast majority of sporting tournaments, relative prizes are not 
larger in the Losers’ Round than they are in the Finals’ Round,11
 
 Assumption j is made. 
 
  




                                                 
11 The author is not aware of any situations where this is not the case, but if there is one 
then this analysis cannot be applied. 
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)  then with 














) and there is an {ND, ND} 
Nash equilibrium in the Finals’ and the Losers’ Round.12
 
  The expected payouts in the 
Qualifying Round for Region (i) would then be (5.3.5) and (5.3.6). 
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 Substituting the payouts in (5.3.5) and (5.3.6) into (5.3.3) and dividing through by 




























                                                 















































 To determine the strategy spaces each strategy will be numerically solved for the 
US Open parameters a=1, b= 0.5, d=0.219 and f = 0.109.  From these parameters the  
strategy spaces, in terms of the probability of being caught doping, r and the fine for 
being caught, cA = C, can be determined.  Equations (5.3.7) and (5.3.8) along with the  
reaction curves from the Finals’ Round, ((5.1.4), (5.1.5)) and Losers’ Round, ((5.2.2), 
(5.2.3)) are plotted on (r,c) for the US Open parameter values in Figure 5.9.   
 If the expected cost of doping, (rc) is large enough to deter doping in the Finals’ 
Round (the dark grey region) then it will certainly be large enough to deter doping in the 
Losers’ Round, since all (r,c) to the right of (5.1.5) are to the right of (5.2.3).  Equations 
(5.1.5) and (5.3.8) cross at (r,c) = (0.145, 1.72) subsequently an expected cost of doping  
sufficiently large enough to satisfy Condition 2 will establish a dominant not-doping pure  














72.1  but for c > 1.72 we need to look to  














rac  to establish the  




















Condition 7:  If,   






























            then the strictly dominant strategy for all players is to choose not-dope and  
            assuming rational players, the pure strategy Nash equilibrium for the    
            Qualifying Round is at {ND, ND}. 
 
 
 We can see how this plays out with a numerical example.  The payout equations 
for Region i are represented in the 2x2 matrix (Figure 5.10).  Payouts are symmetric.  For 
simplicity only player 1’s payouts are shown. 
 An expected cost which would satisfy Condition 7 would be (r,c) = (0.3, 1), the 
expected payouts are calculated in Figure 5.11, normalizing the payouts and dividing 
through by A. If (r,c) = (0.3, 1) then the dominant strategy for player 1 is ND and with 
symmetric payouts, the dominant strategy for player 2 is ND and there is a pure strategy 
Nash Equilibrium at {ND, ND}.   
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231 ) and 
there is a {D,D} Nash equilibrium in the Finals’ Round and the Losers’ Round.13
 
  The  
                                                 
 13 Assumption j allows us to say that: 

















































Player 2 plays D 
 
 



































































































Player 2 plays D 
 
 



















Figure 5.11: Game matrix of expected payouts for Player i in the tournament, (r,c) = 























(5.3.9)  Qualifying Round Win =      ¸¸¹
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1 2MS  if Condition 
 4 and Condition 1 are satisfied.  
(5.3.10)  Qualifying Round Loss = 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 Equations (5.3.10) and (5.3.12) along with the reaction curves from the Finals’ 
Round, ((5.1.4), (5.1.5)) and Losers’ Round, ((5.2.2), (5.2.3)) are plotted on (r,c) for the 
US Open parameter values in Figure 5.12.   
 If the expected cost of doping is small enough to create an incentive for doping in 
the Losers’ Round then it will certainly be small enough to create an incentive for doping 
in the Finals’ Round (the light grey area of Figure 5.12), since all (r,c) to the left of 
(5.2.2) are to the left of (5.1.4).  Equations (5.2.2) and (5.3.10) cross at (r,c) = (0.276, 
0.096)  
subsequently a cost of doping sufficiently small enough to create a dominant pure 
strategy of doping in the Losers’ Round will establish a dominant doping strategy in the 

















































 .  This allows for 























Condition 8: If,  















































   
    then the strictly dominant strategy for all players is choose dope and   
               assuming rational players, the pure strategy Nash equilibrium for the        
               Qualifying Round is at {D,D}. 
 
Furthermore, if Condition 8 is satisfied then the tournament game will be a Prisoners 
Dilemma.  
 We can again use a numerical example as a demonstration. Using the US Open 
parameters, normalizing by dividing through by A and letting (r,c) = (0.04, 1) then 
substituting the expected payouts from (5.3.9) and (5.3.10) into the matrix of Figure 5.8 
gives Figure 5.13.  If (r,c) = (0.04,1) then the dominant strategy for player 1 is D and with 
symmetric payouts, the dominant strategy for player 2 is D and there is a pure strategy 
Nash equilibrium at {D,D}. 
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)  then there will be a pure strategy Nash 





Player 2 plays D 
 
 



















Figure 5.13: Game matrix of expected payouts for Player i in the tournament, (r,c) =  



















strategy {D, D} in the Finals’ Round.  The expected payouts in the Qualifying Round for 




(5.3.13)  Qualifying Round Win =      ¸¸¹
·
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§  < crrarrbaA 1
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1 2S  if 
 Condition 2 is not satisfied and Condition 5 is satisfied.  
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 Equations (5.3.15) and (5.3.16) along with the reaction curves from the Finals’ 
Round, ((5.1.4), (5.1.5)) and Losers’ Round, ((5.2.2), (5.2.3)) are plotted on (r,c) for the 
US Open parameter values in Figure 5.14.   
 The light blue area of Figure 5.14 is the region where the expected cost of doping 
is large enough for a dominant not-doping strategy in the Losers’ Round (i.e., Condition 
5 is satisfied) but is not large enough for a dominant not-doping strategy in the Finals’  
Round (i.e., Condition 1 is satisfied).  If this were a oneshot game with the payouts being 
a and b then the dominant pure strategy would be D for both players, but if it were a one 
shot game with payouts d and f then the dominant pure strategy would be ND for both  
players.  In the case of the tournament, if the expected cost is large enough to deter 
doping in the Losers’ Round but small enough to not deter doping in the Finals’ Round 
there will be a dominant pure strategy of D in the Qualifying Round, from this we can get  
Condition 9.  In this region there is a strictly dominant pure strategy of doping in the 
Qualifying Rounds which establishes Condition 9.   
 
Condition 9:  If     
 
 











































rd  then   
           the strictly dominant strategy for all players is choose dope, assuming   
           rational players, the pure strategy Nash equilibrium for the tournament is at       





















 A comparative numerical example might be useful here.  Using the US Open 
parameters, normalizing by dividing through by A and letting (r,c) = (0.06, 2) then 
substituting the expected payouts from (5.3.13) and (5.3.14) into the matrix of Figure 5.8 
gives Figure 5.15. 
 If (r,c) = (0.06,2) then the dominant strategy for player 1 is D and with symmetric 
payouts, the dominant strategy for player 2 is D and there is a pure strategy Nash 
equilibrium at {D,D}.  On the other hand, using these same expected costs, (r,c) = 
(0.06,2) in the Losers’ Round matrix (Figure 5.6) gives the expected payouts in Figure  
5.16.  From this we see that there is a pure strategy not-doping Nash equilibrium in the 
Losers’ Round. 
 
5.7   Tournament Equilibrium 
 
 The Pure strategy Nash equilibrium for the Tournament game can be determined 






















   
Player 2 plays D 
 
 



















Figure 5.15: Game matrix of expected payouts for Player i in the tournament, (r,c) =             





















   
Player 2 plays D 
 
 



















Figure 5.16: Game matrix of expected payouts for Player i in the Losers’ Round, (r,c) =    
























 Figure 5.17, plots (5.1.5), (5.2.2), (5.3.8), (5.3.11) and (5.3.15) on the (r,c) plane. 
From Figure 5.17 we see that expected costs, rc, which satisfy C9 will also satisfy C8, 
thus only (5.3.15) is necessary for a {D, D} pure strategy Nash equilibrium.  The 
dominant pure strategy Nash Equilibriums for the Tournament are then Condition-ND 
and Condition-D.     
 
Condition-ND:  If,   






























    then the strictly dominant strategy for all players is to choose not-dope       
               in all rounds of the tournament and assuming rational players, the pure    
               strategy Nash equilibrium for the tournament is at {ND, ND}. 
 
Condition-D:  If, 
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  then the strictly dominant strategy for all players is to choose dope  in all  
  rounds  of the tournament and assuming rational players, the pure strategy  






















 An example of how sporting organizing bodies can use the Performance 
Enhancing Drug game could be useful here.  The probability of being caught doping is 
indeterminate since we do not know the number of athletes using drugs.  In order to make 
a decision the rational athlete will have to make an estimate as to what they believe the 
probability of them being caught in fact is.  What we can do with the Performance 
Enhancing Drug game is compute the required costs necessary to deter doping given 
various estimates on the probability of being caught.  It has been assumed throughout this 
chapter that the probability of being caught is less than 0.5.  Using the equations derived 
in the No-Doping equilibrium (Condition-ND) pure strategy and the Doping equilibrium 
(Condition-D) pure strategy we can determine the penalty required to deter doping as a 
percentage of the first place prize, A, for four different probabilities of being caught, r = 
0.1, r = 0.2, r = 0.3 and r = 0.4.  Table 5.1 reports values of c for each value of r, where c 
is computed from the equations in Condition-ND and Condition-D. 
 The penalties for being caught doping vary from sport to sport, the penalty for 
professional tennis is a 2-year suspension from competition.  We can estimate the cost of 
doping to any athlete by letting the expected fine be equal to two times the player’s 
winnings over the course of 1 year.  Table 5.2 lists average player prize winnings 
separated by groups and the cost to an athlete in this group of being caught. These do not 
include endorsements or salaries.  The reward for winning the 2009 US Open is $1.6 
million. 
 We can use Table 5.1 and Table 5.2 to determine athlete strategies.  Table 5.1 
gives the cost of doping for five different probabilities of being caught and Table 5.2 




D, D and ND, ND regions for different probabilities of being caught 
 






0.1 c > 2.658 c < 1.658 
0.2 c > 1.250 c < 0.527 
0.3 c > 0.833 c < 0.042 
0.4 c > 0.625 c < 0 
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being caught doping is 0.1 then the cost of a 2-year suspension will only be sufficient to 
deter the top 10 players from doping.  The pure strategy for all athletes outside of the top 
10 is to use dope, since the cost of doping for these rankings is less than 1.658.  
Increasing the probability of being caught to 0.2 deters the top 20 players from doping, 
any player outside of the top 50 will have a pure strategy of doping and players between 
21 and 50 will choose dope with a positive probability.  Further increasing the probability 
of being caught to 0.3 deters the top 30 from doping, but there is no pure strategy of 
doping for all the other players.  If the probability of being caught is 0.4 then the pure 
strategy is not dope for the top 50 with the others choosing dope with 0< probability < 1.  
At a probability of being caught doping at 0.4 would require negative costs to establish a 
pure strategy of doping, since costs are assumed to be greater than zero there will be no 
pure strategy doping equilibrium for such a high probability of being caught.  Even when 
the probability of being caught is as high as 0.49 there will still not be a pure strategy not-
doping equilibrium for players outside of the top 50.       
 
5.8   Discussion 
 This analysis started out with three questions:  Does the increased chance of being 
caught create a larger or smaller incentive for doping in the tournament relative to the 
single shot game?  How does a lower probability of winning in the tournament affect an 
athlete’s doping strategy?  Does greater equality in the reward scheme create a larger 
incentive or disincentive to doping?   
 Questions 1 and 2 can be addressed by comparing the equilibrium in a single 
game with the equilibrium in the tournament game.  We can use the Finals’ Round as an  
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example of a single one shot game and compare that to the Tournament game.  
Continuing with the US Open parameters we get Figure 5.18. 
 For starters, the dark grey region to the Northeast produces pure strategy not-
doping equilibrium in both games and the light and the light grey region to the Southwest 
produces pure strategy doping equilibrium in both games.  The green region produces a 
pure strategy doping equilibrium in the single game, but in the tournament expected 
costs, rc, in this region will produce unstable equilibrium.  Since there is not a pure 
strategy for the tournament game in this region but players have to choose either dope or 
not-dope, players will not choose to dope with certainty nor will they choose not to not- 
dope with certainty.  Thus in the tournament game the green region indicates player 
strategies of doping with 0 < probability < 1 and not-doping with 0 < probability < 1.  
The blue region is a pure strategy not-doping region in the tournament and results in 
unstable player strategies in the single game, thus players will dope with 0 < probability 
< 1 and not-dope with 0 < probability < 1.  The small yellow region in the middle is a 
pure strategy not-doping region in the single game but strategies are unstable in the 
tournament, so in the yellow region players with choose dope with 0 < probability < 1 
and choose not-dope with 0 < probability < 1.  Visual inspection tells us that, at least in 
the case of the US Open, the yellow region is smaller than the blue and green regions 
together.  Therefore there is a smaller range of expected costs in which an athlete would 
choose PEDs in the tournament.   
 The green region is particularly informative for organizing bodies wishing to 
deter PED use in that higher fines and/or a higher probability of catching a drug user is 


















opposed to competition construct along the lines of a tournament.  The green region also 
tells us that there is more uncertainty, assuming the green region is larger than the blue 
region, as to whether or not an athlete will use PEDs in a tournament compared to a 
single game.  This increased amount of uncertainty is likely due to the assumption of 
equally skilled players.  The assumption of equal skill levels makes winning any round a 
matter of chance.  The more rounds the tournament plays means there is more 
opportunity for chance to affect the outcome.  An athlete could be more likely to dope in 
a tournament than in a single game because the chance of them losing due to some 
random effect is larger in the tournament, making an athlete more apt to take measures 
(e.g., use PEDs) to ensure their position.  The assumption of equally skilled athletes could 
be a limiting factor in this game.  Uwe Sunde notes that “rankings provide a good 
indicator about their opponents current shape” (Sunde, 2003, p. 18). 
 So what does this say about a given player’s probability of choosing to use 
performance enhancing drugs in a tournament relative to a single game?  The tournament 
format appears to establish a disincentive for PED use relative to the single game.  In the 
green region an athlete will choose to use PEDs with probability = 1 in the single game 
but will choose to use PEDs with 0 < probability < 1 in the tournament.  In the blue 
region an athlete will choose to use PEDs with probability = 0 in the tournament but will 
choose to use PEDs in the single game with 0 < probability < 1.  The only expected cost 
region where an athlete is more likely to use PEDs in the single game relative to the 
tournament is the yellow region where an athlete will choose PEDs with probability = 0 
in the single game and 0 < probability < 1 in the tournament.   
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 We can answer the first two questions.  The increased chance of being caught 
doping in the tournament creates a smaller incentive for doping in the tournament relative 
to the single shot game.  Therefore organizing bodies wishing to deter drug use in 
tournaments do not need to set as high a penalty for being caught as they would if the 
competition were only a single game.  Furthermore, a lower probability of winning in the 
tournament appears to deter athletes from using PEDs relative to a single game. 
 Figure 5.18 also points out the ineffectiveness of increasing the cost of being 
caught doping if the probability of being caught doping is fairly low (r < 0.08).  It seems 
reasonable to assume that one of the most difficult aspects of deterring doping is actually 
catching the offender and the reality of the situation is such that the probability of being  
caught doping is fairly small.  For example, in the 2004 Olympic games there were 3000 
drug tests performed with 23 positives, 10 of which were weight lifters on the same team 
(Savalecu, Foddy & Clayton, 2004).  We cannot assume that all of the 3000 athletes were 
using banned substances but this is only 0.8% of the athletes and this was the most ever 
positives in Olympic competition.  Given these results and the increased possibility of a 
false positive with more testing focusing on the penalty could if anything exacerbate 
conflict between the organizing body, the athletes and the fans.  The Danish doping 
expert Verner Møller notes that when speaking about cycling “the greatest danger to 
sport are the many people of good will who do not seem to understand that their helping 
hands have sport in a stranglehold that will eventually choke the life out of it” (Gleaves, 
2010, p. 193).  So what is an organizing body to do if they cannot increase the probability 
of being caught very much and increasing the fine for being caught, at low r, is 
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ineffective?  One possible policy measure is to decrease the inequality of the rewards for 
the athletes. 
 For an example of a more equal reward scheme we can look to auto racing.  Peter 
von Allmen (2001) reports on the winnings of the top 30 drivers in the 1999 Winston Cup  
final season standings.  For our purposes the top four drivers will do, where the top driver 
Dale Jarrett won $3,608, 829, the second place rider earned $3,550,341, third place 




  1st place = aA = A = $3,608, 829 and a = 1 
  2nd place = bA=B = $3,550,341, and 98.0
829,608,3$
341,550,3$   b  
  3rd place= dA = D= $2,783,296 and, 77.0
829,608,3$
296,782,2$   d  
  4th place = fA = F = $2,615,226 and, 72.0
829,608,3$
226,615,2$   f  
 
We can then plug these values into equations (5.1.5), (5.3.8) and (5.3.15) and compare 
these reaction curves with the US Open values which are more unevenly distributed, 
Figure 5.19. 
 From Figure 5.19 we see that the more even payouts of NASCAR shift the 
reaction curves to the left which decreases the size of the doping region and increases the 
size of the no-doping region in the tournament.  This is in accord with Peter von 
Allmen’s view when discussing reward schemes in NASCAR, “If rewards are highly 
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nonlinear, drivers have an increased incentive to exhibit reckless behavior” (von Allmen, 
2001, p. 76).  When a driver exhibits reckless behavior they have an increased chance of 
crashing which would remove the sponsor’s advertisement from the race.  Performance 
enhancing drug use is certainly a “highly risky” and “unsportsmanlike” behavior.  It is for 
this reason that regulatory agencies are trying to deter PED use.   
 Following Becker (1968), Maennig (2002) models the use of banned PEDs in 
sports as a microeconomic model of illicit behavior.  Maennig discusses a variety of 
policy measures in regard to deterring the use of PEDs such as externality effects and ad 
ministerial costs.  Maennig concludes that, “An economic solution could increase the 
expected costs of doping by agreeing on financial penalties of a sufficiently high level”  
(Maenning, 2002, p. 83).  The tournament game, Figure 5.18, argues that the policy of  
increasing the costs14
                                                 
14 The Drug Free Sports Act of the 109th Congress is a proposal for a bill which would 
have “established a Federal drug-testing policy, using the standards set by the Olympic 
Committee, for the National Football League, the National Basketball Association, the 
National Hockey League, Major League Baseball, Major League Soccer, and the Arena 
Football League.  The bill would have required a 2-year ban for the first offense and a 
lifetime ban for the second and would have mandated two tests per athlete each year.  
The other steroids related bill, the Clean Sports Act of 2005, sponsored by representatives 
Thomas M. Davis III (R-VA) and Henry A. Waxman (D-CA), would have imposed the 
same penalties but would have required five tests per athlete each year.”  Office of 
Legislative Policy and Analysis, 
http://olpa.od.nih.gov/legislation/109/pendinglegislation/drugsports.asp  
 to the athlete for being caught using PEDs will act as a deterrent 
only if r is sufficiently high already.  A further argument against increasing the penalties 
leveled on athletes for being caught doping is the chance of a false positive.  Berry (2008) 
notes that given the present state of the drug testing procedures in the Tour de France 
there is between an 8% and 34% chance of a false positive.  As such a Tour de France 



















they are not doping.  Not only is increasing the cost of doping ineffective with low r, but 
high fines punish innocent athletes even more as the result of false positives.  A more 
even reward scheme in tournaments could go a long way in alleviating both of these 
issues of unfairness.  The more even reward scheme shifts the doping pure strategy 
region to the left (Figure 5.19), making lower monetary penalties for doping more 
effective at low r and the lower monetary penalties reduce some of the unfairly imposed 
costs to athletes who are victims of false positives.   
 The multistage tournament game argues that in rank order tournaments a more 
equal distribution of skill levels of the athletes could play a role in an athlete’s strategy to 
use PEDs.  Organizing bodies do not wish to reduce uncertainty of outcome so regulating 
the incentive to cheat through controlling the events on the court or field is not a good 
way to go.  As far as I am aware this has not been a strategy used to deter PED use.  The 
focus on increasing the probability of being caught and increasing the penalties 
associated with being caught has been a strategy used to deter doping.  The multistage 
tournament game suggests the alternative strategy of distributing the value of the prizes 














 Chapter 3 addressed the issue of the return to investing in four types of players, 
amateur free agents, drafted players, international free agents and unrestricted free agents.  
Amateur free agents and drafted players produce the largest returns to investment, with 
amateur free agents in their first 3 years of service producing the largest returns overall, 
producing a 446% return to investment in salary over the first 3 years of MLB service. 
International free agents over the first 6 years of their MLB service and unrestricted free 
agents, on the other hand, are producing negative returns to investment.  These results are 
consistent with a “winners curse” in the market for unrestricted free agents and 
International free agents.  The results of this chapter provide a blue print for how a profit 
maximizing team should go about building a profitable team by building a team through 
the draft, particularly pitchers, and through the amateur free agent market for position 
players.  The profitability of the amateur free agent market in conjunction with the sky 
rocketing salaries and the “winners curse” of the unrestricted free agent market could 
explain the recent rise in the numbers of Dominican and Venezuelan players in MLB.  
 In regard to fairness, the policy, suggested by the Blue Ribbon Panel Report, of 
implementing an international reverse order draft would go to some lengths in reducing 





The monopsonistic policy of the reserve clause does its part to exploit players over the 
first 6 years of their contracts whereby players receive $0.51 on average for every dollar 
they produce for the team.  The exploitation is worse over the first 3 years when players 
only receive $0.23 for every dollar in MRP they produce, but the exploitation is even 
worse for the amateur free agent who receives $0.18 on average for every dollar 
produced.  An international player draft could reduce some of this exploitation, 
transferring about $0.05 in MRP back to the amateur free agent.  Since most of these 
amateur free agents come from the Dominican Republic and Venezuela and both of these 
countries already have a fairly well established development league, a reverse order draft 
applied only to these countries could go toward reducing the level of exploitation these 
players are hit with when they come to play in MLB. 
 Chapter 4 addressed the equal distribution of end of season point totals in the 
National Hockey League, the Russian Elite League and the Czech Republic League.  In 
all three of these leagues end of season point totals are becoming more unequally 
distributed and thus the certainty of the outcome of any game is becoming more certain 
over time.  In the NHL, the 1999/00 to 2003/04 seasons showed the lowest level of 
average league parity, which corresponds to scoring system 2 where one point was 
awarded for an overtime loss and 1 point for an overtime tie.  This scoring system was 
subsequently discontinued after the strike season of the 2004/05 season to scoring system 
3 where a shootout decided the victor in the case of a tie game at the end of overtime.  
Scoring system 3 improved league parity bringing it more in line with the years prior to 





 The effect the size of the labor market has on this distribution was tested with the 
results being that when talent becomes more decompressed (i.e., fewer players chasing 
more roster spots), the distribution of end of season point totals is more unequally 
distributed.  Two cases of talent decompression and one case of talent compression were 
tested.  Talent decompression, as was seen with the rival hockey league, in the WHA 
does correspond with a period of a more unequal distribution of end of season point 
totals.  As concerns talent compression there does not seem to be a significant 
relationship between talent decompression and lower inequality. 
 A causal relationship between talent compression/decompression and the 
distribution of end of season point totals turns up insignificant results.  Even though 
players were emigrating out of the Czech Republic and Russia to play in the NHL and the 
distribution of end of season point totals was becoming more unequal it wasn’t the 
change in the size of the talent pool that was driving this phenomenon.  Furthermore the 
increase in the size of the talent pool in the NHL was not driving the distribution of end 
of season point totals.  It appears that in the case of professional hockey, the increased 
opportunities open to Russian and Czech players after the fall of the Berlin Wall has done 
little to reduce the unequal distribution of end of season point totals in the NHL, REL or 
CRL.    
 Chapter 5 addressed the issue of fair and effective punishment for the violating 
the league policy of banned performance enhancing drug use.  A multistage tournament 
game was used to determine if an athlete would more likely engage in using performance 
enhancing drugs to obtain an unfair advantage in a tournament relative to a single one off 





required to deter PED use in a single game relative to a multistage tournament.  A sport 
organizing body wishing to deter PED use would need to establish a higher expected cost 
if the competition were a single game.  The results also argue that if the probability of 
being caught is fairly small then increasing the costs to doping are ineffective in deterring 
doping in either a multistage tournament or a single game.  This result argues that the 
policy of increasing the fine for being caught will not act to deter doping unless the 
science of catching dopers can increase the probability of being caught to a high enough 
level.  For example, if the probability of being caught doping were increased from 0.1 to 
0.14 a no doping Nash equilibrium could be obtained with a fine that is twice as large as 
the prize for winning but if the probability of being caught doping were to stay at 0.1 then 
the fine would have to be three times the reward for winning.  Given that there is a 
positive probability1
 Most sporting events can be viewed as tournaments and not single games.  Even 
sports such as football, which play a single game once a week for 16 weeks, can be 
modeled as a tournament where the season is seen as the qualifying rounds and the 
playoffs are the finals.  The results demonstrated in Chapter 5 would suggest that the 
 of a false positive in any testing procedure increasing fines at low 
probability of being caught could be viewed as an unfair policy which in effect increases 
the punishment to innocent athletes and does little to prevent athletes from using PEDs.  
Furthermore, if a sport organizing body wishes to increase the probability of being caught 
by increasing the number of tests as opposed to the accuracy of the tests they will also 
work to increase the number of false positives.      
                                                 
1 Berry (2008) estimates between an 8 and 34% chance of a false positive in the Tour de 





policy of increasing the fines for doping in all sports is at best an ineffective policy and at 
worst, due to false positives, an ineffective and unfair policy.    
 Chapter 5 also looked at the structure of the reward scheme in the tournament to 
determine if a more or less equal reward scheme could be used to deter PED use among 
athletes.  It is shown that a more highly nonlinear reward scheme creates a larger 
incentive relative to a more linear reward scheme, for athletes to use PEDs.  This would 
suggest that increasing the equality of the prizes would act to deter drug use on its own as 
long as there were a probability > 0 of being caught and fine > 0 for being caught.   
 Taking these two issues into account, the ineffectiveness of high fines at low 
probability of being caught and the deterrence effects of more equal prizes, an effective 
drug deterrent policy would focus on more equal prizes and not on increasing the 
punishment for being caught.  A policy of this sort would be both more effective and fair 
with a more equal reward scheme and a lower probability of punishing an innocent 
athlete through increasing the likelihood of a false positive.    
 This research project began with a discussion of John Rawls’ just social contract. 
Noting that “nature deals out attributes and social positions in a random or accidental 
way” (Rawls, 1971, p. 15).  It was then discussed that league policy, as in the reverse 
order draft are directed at creating a just league by guiding the manner through which 
player attributes, in this case player talent, are distributed.  It turns out that the draft does 
not provide teams with more ability to exploit players rather the contrary seems to hold 
amateur free agents are exploited more than are drafted players.  It was then hypothesized 
that nature itself, in the sense of more high talent players chasing fewer roster spots could 





be working for or against league parity.  Finally, the level of fairness was brought down 
to the court of play, where the use of performance enhancing drugs is seen as providing 
an unfair advantage to one athlete.  A fair league wishing to deter this unfair advantage 
would be better served by equalizing the prizes and not increasing the fine for doping.       
 
6.1   Future Research 
 This dissertation has answered some questions and brought up some more 
questions for future research.  A further extension would be to see if small market teams 
are being disproportionately harmed by the free agent winners curse and to see if teams 
who have been in the Dominican Republic longer have become more efficient in regard 
to their salaries for Dominican players.  The relationship between economic efficiency 
and winning could also be addressed.  Are the more economically efficient St. Louis 
Cardinals also more likely to win?  One could also look at why players who change teams 
in the first 3 years increase their salary, but if they change in years 4, 5 or 6 their salary 
decreases. 
 In regard to the draft one could look to the competitive balance implications of an 
international reverse order draft using the implementation of a reverse order draft for 
Canadian and Puerto Rican baseball in 1990.  In addition, since the NHL includes 
international players in their reverse order draft one could compare competitive balance 
in the NHL with that in MLB.  It could also be interesting to use the methodology in 
Chapter 3 to assess what the return to investment for international hockey players is and 
compare the degree of exploitation or positive return to investment for incoming 





player birth places could be used to look at the relationship between attendance and the 
number of international players on a given team.   
 In regard to competitive balance, the National Basketball Association (NBA) has 
recently been compared to the English Premier League in regard to the concentration of 
talented players on fewer teams.  The adjusted R measure which takes into account tie 
games could be used to compare competitive balance in the NBA and the EPL.  A similar 
analysis of the decompressing effects on the NFL of the rival AFL and USFL could 
provide more information as to the role of talent supply and competitive balance.   
 The Performance Enhancing Drug game could be extended to the inclusion of 
false positives.  How does including the possibility of a false positive change the doping 
strategy?  One would intuitively expect that if an athlete thought they might be punished 
even if they chose not to use PEDs then they would be more likely to use PEDs since 
they might think what do I have to lose?  It should also be addressed in this research that 
when the probability of being caught is increased through a greater number of tests, then 











THE ROLE OF CONJECTURES IN MODELS OF PROFESSIONAL  



















 In the sports league models conjectures become relevant in the calculation of the 
marginal product of talent.  In a two team league the winning percent of team 1 is a 
function of the talent of team 1 and the talent of team 2.  We can express this as: w1 = 
w1(t1,t2) and w2 = w2(t1,t2).  The zero sum nature of sports or the adding up constraint 
requires that w2 = 1 – w1.  A change in winning percent is the marginal product of talent 
(MPT).  MPT is the derivative of the winning function in terms of own team talent.  In 
other words, the owner is asking herself, how much will my teams winning percent 
change with a change in an increment of talent.  This decision for the owner of team 1 












 Talent is a notoriously elusive characteristic to model due to the fact that it is 
difficult to observe.  For this reason sports economists1
 
 have used ‘contest success 
function’s’ (CSF’s) to relate unobserved talent to observed winning percentage.  The 
most common form is the logistic form. 
 
 








   
                                                 
 1 Of note are:  El Hodiri and Quirk (1971), Fort and Quirk (1995), Vrooman 
(1995), Rascher (1997), Syzmanski (2003, 2004), Syzmanski and Kesenne (2004) and 
Kesenne (2006, 2007).  
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 In order to determine the marginal product of talent for team 1 (in what follows 




























little impact on winning” (Fort & Winfree, 2007, p. 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the moment.  Yielding (3a). 
 
 



















Equation 3a shows that the incremental change in winning percent of team 1 depends on 













dt  is where the conjecture comes into play.   
 El-Hodiri and Quirk (1971), Fort and Quirk (1995), Vrooman (1995) and Quirk 




dt = -1) so that if one team 
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acquires a player and receives a talent gain then that gain is equivalent to a lose of the 
other team.  As noted above this result in a conclusion consistent with the invariance 
principal in that revenue sharing will have no effect on competitive balance.  Syzmanski 
and Kessene (2004) and Syzmanski (2004) allow for a flexible talent supply such that one 
team’s talent decision has no effect on the other team’s winning percent.   The flexible 




dt = 0.  The result is that revenue sharing has a 































 For Chapter 3, team and player performance statistics, birth countries, high school 
or college attended and salaries from the Lahman Baseball Database at 
www.baseball1.com.  Total revenue data were from Rodney Fort at www.rodneyfort.com 
which for the years prior to 2001 come from Financial World Magazine and after 2001 
from Forbes Magazine.   
 For Chapter 4 end of season point totals for the Russian Elite League and the 
Czech Republic League are from The Internet Hockey Database at www.hockeydb.com. 
End of season point totals for the NHL are from SHRP sports at www.SHRPsports.com  
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